

FRAGILE STATES INDEX ANNUAL REPORT 2023

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
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
FRAGILE STATES INDEX

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THE WORLD IN 2023





FRAGILE STATES INDEX

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VERY SUSTAINABLE

- 14.5 Norway (179)
- 15.7 Iceland (178)
- 16.0 Finland (177)
- 16.7 New Zealand (176)
- 17.8 Switzerland (175)
- 17.9 Denmark (174)
- 18.9 Canada (173)
- 19.5 Ireland (171)
- 19.5 Luxembourg (171)

SUSTAINABLE

- 20.6 Sweden (170)
- 21.0 Netherlands (169)
- 22.0 Australia (168)
- 24.4 Austria (167)
- 24.6 Germany (166)
- 25.5 Singapore (165)
- 25.7 Portugal (164)
- 27.3 Slovenia (163)
- 28.8 France (162)

VERY STABLE

- 30.5 Japan (161)
- 31.4 Belgium (160)
- 31.5 South Korea (159)
- 33.0 Malta (158)
- 34.4 Uruguay (157)
- 37.0 United Arab Emirates (156)
- 37.8 Slovakia (155)
- 38.0 Mauritius (154)
- 38.6 Estonia (153)
- 39.4 Lithuania (152)

MORE STABLE

- 40.2 Czechia (151)
- 40.4 Costa Rica (150)
- 40.5 Qatar (149)
- 41.9 United Kingdom (148)
- 42.2 Chile (147)
- 42.6 Italy (146)
- 43.3 Latvia (145)
- 43.5 Spain (144)
- 44.1 Israel (143)
- 45.2 Poland (142)
- 45.3 United States (141)
- 45.4 Barbados (140)
- 46.4 Argentina (139)
- 48.7 Croatia (136)
- 48.7 Oman (136)
- 48.7 Panama (136)
- 48.8 Hungary (135)
- 49.2 Bahamas (134)

STABLE

- 51.2 Kuwait (133)
- 51.3 Mongolia (132)
- 51.8 Bulgaria (131)
- 52.9 Trinidad and Tobago (130)
- 53 Romania (129)
- 53.3 Seychelles (128)
- 53.7 Grenada (127)
- 53.8 Antigua and Barbuda (126)
- 54.7 Brunei Darussalam (125)
- 55.0 Malaysia (124)
- 55.1 Greece (123)
- 55.3 Botswana (122)
- 56.8 Albania (121)
- 57.0 Cyprus (120)
- 58.0 Montenegro (119)
- 58.3 Vietnam (118)
- 59.5 Cuba (117)
- 59.7 Suriname (116)
- 59.8 Belize (115)

WARNING

- 60.1 Cabo Verde (114)
- 60.3 North Macedonia (112)
- 60.3 Namibia (112)
- 60.6 Kazakhstan (111)
- 60.8 Dominican Republic (110)
- 61.6 Guyana (109)
- 61.9 Jamaica (108)
- 62.3 Ghana (107)
- 62.9 Maldives (106)
- 63.7 Paraguay (105)
- 64.5 Turkmenistan (104)
- 65.1 Bahrain (101)
- 65.1 China (101)
- 65.1 Samoa (101)
- 65.3 Saudi Arabia (100)
- 65.5 Gabon (99)
- 65.6 Indonesia (98)
- 66.4 Tunisia (96)
- 66.4 Bhutan (96)
- 66.8 Uzbekistan (95)
- 67.4 Moldova (94)
- 67.5 Armenia (93)
- 67.9 Serbia (92)
- 68.0 Thailand (91)
- 68.2 Morocco (90)
- 69.3 El Salvador (88)
- 69.3 Micronesia (88)
- 69.4 Ecuador (87)
- 69.7 Sao Tome and Principe (86)
- 69.8 Mexico (85)
- 69.9 Belarus (84)
- 70.0 Algeria (83)

2023 SCORES

ELEVATED WARNING

70.2 Fiji (82)
70.7 Bolivia (81)
71.5 Senegal (80)
71.9 Georgia (79)
72.0 South Africa (78)
72.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina (77)
72.7 Azerbaijan (76)
73.1 Peru (75)
73.3 Benin (74)
74.1 India (73)
74.2 Tajikistan (72)
74.5 Brazil (71)
74.7 Laos (70)
75.6 Kyrgyzstan (69)
75.7 Jordan (68)
76.1 Gambia (67)
76.3 Lesotho (66)
76.6 Tanzania (65)
77.3 Guatemala (64)
77.5 Timor-Leste (63)
77.7 Nicaragua (62)
77.8 Philippines (61)
78.1 Colombia (59)
78.1 Papua New Guinea (59)
79.1 Eswatini (58)
79.6 Honduras (56)
79.6 Solomon Islands (56)

HIGH WARNING

80.2 Nepal (55)
80.3 Cambodia (54)
80.7 Russia (53)
81.2 Türkiye (52)
81.4 Sierra Leone (51)
81.6 Egypt (50)
81.7 Madagascar (49)
81.8 Zambia (48)
82.1 Togo (47)
82.2 Djibouti (45)
82.2 Comoros (45)
82.3 Rwanda (44)
83.2 Malawi (43)
84.4 Equatorial Guinea (42)
85.2 Bangladesh (41)
85.4 Iran (40)
86.9 Angola (39)
87.0 Mauritania (37)
87.0 North Korea (37)
87.1 Côte d'Ivoire (36)
87.8 Kenya (35)
87.9 Palestine (34)
88.9 Liberia (33)
89.9 Pakistan (31)
89.9 Guinea Bissau (31)

ALERT

90.3 Sri Lanka (30)
90.5 Venezuela (29)
90.7 Congo Republic (28)
91.4 Iraq (27)
91.5 Uganda (26)
91.8 Lebanon (25)
93.4 Niger (24)
94.0 Cameroon (21)
94.0 Mozambique (21)
94.0 Burkina Faso (21)
94.2 Burundi (20)
94.5 Eritrea (19)
95.9 Ukraine (18)
96.1 Libya (17)
96.9 Zimbabwe (16)
98.0 Nigeria (15)
98.5 Guinea (14)
99.5 Mali (13)

HIGH ALERT

100.2 Myanmar (12)
100.4 Ethiopia (11)
102.9 Haiti (10)
104.6 Chad (9)
105.7 Central African Republic (8)
106.2 Sudan (7)
106.6 Afghanistan (6)
107.1 Syria (5)
107.2 Congo Democratic Republic (4)
108.5 South Sudan (3)
108.9 Yemen (2)

VERY HIGH ALERT

111.9 Somalia (1)

FUND FOR PEACE SMARTER APPROACHES TO A COMPLEX WORLD

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Fragile and Conflict
Affected States



Contextual Risk Tools



Data for Peace



Conflict Early Warning and
Response



Preventing Election
Violence

WE EMPOWER STAKEHOLDERS



Responsible Business
Practices



Security Assessments and
Guidance



Convening Mutli-
Stakeholder Initiatives



Preventing Gender-Based
Violence



Combatting Violent
Extremism

WE HELP DIVERSE STAKEHOLDERS



Contextual Risk
Assessments



Security Standard
Compliance



Security Risk Assessments



Training and
Capacity Building



Publicly Available Data

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Twisting and Turning: Why Fragility Still Matters in a Time of Great Power Competition

Nate Haken

After the attacks of 9/11 an uneasy consensus began to emerge among the national security establishment, humanitarian, and international development actors around state fragility as a unified theory and organizing principle by which to develop policy. Institution building and economic development in places like Iraq and Afghanistan were understood not only as a humanitarian imperative, but also a matter of national interest. Implicit to the argument was that state fragility incubates and grows at the outer edges of the rules-based international system, and if allowed to spread, could adversely affect the developed world through cross-border conflict, refugees, disease, and radicalization. This concern drove aggressive counterterrorism operations and provided the theoretical underpinnings to stabilization operations. Furthermore, framing humanitarian operations and international development, including health, education, and infrastructure, through the lens of fragility provided a national security justification behind what was previously seen as an opportunity to advance soft power through altruism. Stable countries in dangerous neighborhoods were designated as “anchor states” and treated as a bulwark against chaos.

Ultimately, this consensus culminated in the welcome passage of the landmark 2019 Global Fragility Act, which presented, “a new and necessary opportunity for the U.S. Government to prioritize conflict prevention and transform how it partners with countries affected by fragility and conflict to foster a more peaceful and stable world.”¹ Under the implementation of the law, countries designated as priorities included Haiti (ranked 10th on the FSI 2023), Libya (17th), Mozambique (21st), and

12 MOST WORSENEDED COUNTRIES 2023

+27.3	↗	Ukraine	+3.1	↗	Türkiye
+11.0	↗	Sri Lanka	+3.0	↗	Poland
+8.1	↗	Russia	+2.9	↗	Moldova
+3.5	↗	Burkina Faso	+2.3	↗	Palestine
+3.3	↗	Peru	+2.2	↗	Romania
+3.2	↗	Haiti	+1.8	↗	Libya

12 MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES 2023

-2.8	↘	Yemen	-2.6	↘	Vietnam
-2.8	↘	Uzbekistan	-2.5	↘	Côte d'Ivoire
-2.7	↘	Bolivia	-2.5	↘	Gambia
-2.7	↘	Philippines	-2.4	↘	Iraq
-2.6	↘	Guyana	-2.4	↘	Central African Republic
-2.6	↘	Namibia	-2.3	↘	North Macedonia

Papua New Guinea (59th), along with the West Africa littoral states of Guinea (ranked 14th), Côte d'Ivoire (36th), Ghana (107th), Togo (47th), and Benin (74th).

For all its strengths and weaknesses as a unified theory of international relations, in 2022 the focus on state fragility began to shift. As NATO withdrew from Afghanistan, Russia invaded Ukraine, and concerns over the fate of Taiwan and the

semiconductor industry as well as the escalating presence, and recognized threat of propaganda and disinformation flooded the foreign policy discourse, the previous emphasis on state fragility in countries like Sudan and Syria is taking a back seat to Great Power Competition.

But 2023's Fragile States Index clearly demonstrates that fragility still matters and is not easily contained. Worryingly, this year's events undermined the facile notion that fragility is a threat that only spreads from poor countries. Instead, contagion went the other way round as war in Europe led to inflation, fuel riots, and food insecurity in vulnerable countries around the world. Further, we learned that the Great Powers, whether that be China, Russia, or Western democracies, may be more fragile than we think.

Fragility in Lower and Middle-Income Countries

The bounce back from the COVID recession combined with economic disruptions due to the war in Ukraine led to the highest rates of inflation since the 1990s, especially in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Inflation in Central Asia and the Caucasus was at 51.6%,² which was a blow to countries that had demonstrated some of the greatest long-term improvement on the Fragile States Index over the last two decades, such as Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, as the Russia-Ukraine war contributed to rising commodity prices.³ In the Middle East, inflation was estimated at 14.5%,⁴ with especially high rates in Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia. In Africa, inflation averaged 14.3%, the highest since 1996. In Eastern Europe, inflation stood at 14.2% due to increases in food and fuel prices.^{5,6}

The last time a global food price shock was so evident in the Fragile States Index was in the run-up to the Global Recession of 2008, when oil prices were skyrocketing and food riots broke out in over a dozen countries from Latin America and

the Caribbean, to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.⁷ In 2022, according to the FAO, over a quarter billion people in 58 countries faced acute food insecurity, a situation which has worsened for four years in a row and was exacerbated in 2022 by the war in Ukraine, a major producer of wheat and maize.⁸ Also in 2022 over 90 countries experienced fuel riots,⁹ some of which were the same countries that had food riots in 2008, such as Haiti and Peru, both of which were among the most worsened on the FSI this year. Sri Lanka, which is the most worsened country this year after Ukraine, is 4,000 miles away from the European theater of war, but was nevertheless adversely impacted with an exacerbation of an already brewing economic crisis that led to a default on loans including those due to China (as part of the Belt and Road initiative¹⁰) and India,¹¹ which then turned into a full blown political crisis in 2022.¹²

China and the West have competed for influence and access to resources across the Global South, through loans, development, security assistance, and conditionalities, for purposes of advancing their own respective interests such as trade, stabilization, and counterterrorism. Where Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards are not prioritized, including human rights and conflict sensitivity, this has had negative effects. Russia's Wagner Group, a paramilitary group that has been accused of atrocities in Syria and Ukraine, has also been involved in Africa, including Burkina Faso (the fifth most worsened country on the FSI this year), allegedly in exchange for access to minerals,¹³ although the minister of mines has denied that allegation. Burkina Faso had two separate coups d'état in 2022, the first of which deposed President Roch Marc Christian in January and the second of which removed interim President Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.¹⁴ Other African countries that the Wagner Group has allegedly been involved in include Mali (which has worsened on the Fragile States Index for the last six years in a row), Central African Republic, and Sudan (which is rapidly descending into civil war as of early 2023).¹⁵

Fragility in Russia

If the competition between the Great Powers has contributed to more fragility in other, more vulnerable countries, the risk is even more acute in a situation of rising fragility within the Great Powers themselves. The most obvious case is that of Russia (the third most worsened country after Ukraine and Sri Lanka) which has been demonstrated to be much weaker than previously supposed. Frustrated by its inability to quickly defeat Ukraine, Russia has turned sharply toward authoritarianism and cracked down on free speech and civil liberties, as the economy has been strained by sanctions and the cost of war. Thousands have fled conscription.¹⁶ Convicts were recruited to join the Wagner Group to fight in Ukraine in exchange for the promise of commuted sentences.¹⁷ War criminals who allegedly slaughtered civilians in Bucha were rewarded with an honorary title by President Putin.¹⁸ An arrest warrant was issued for Putin himself and Russia's commissioner for children's rights by the International Criminal Court in connection with the forced deportation of thousands of children from Ukraine.¹⁹ In 2023, Finland and Sweden completed accession talks to join the NATO alliance.²⁰ While Russia's expansionism was an attempt to consolidate power and influence, the effect has been a weakening both domestically and abroad.

Fragility in China

China has been a rising power since the 1990s. As of 2023 it has the largest population,²¹ the second largest GDP,²² and the second largest military expenditure after the United States.²³ However, through the lens of the Fragile States Index there are signs of weakness that could undermine its domestic and global ambitions over the long term. While it has become less fragile since 2013 overall, the indicators for State Legitimacy and Human Rights remain stubbornly high. And the Demographic Pressures indicator (which measures disease,

natural disasters, water scarcity, and environment, as well as fertility, mortality, and population pressures) has started to worsen in the last three years. A shrinking workforce and an aging population will present increasing social and economic challenges which could contribute to an even more authoritarian posture to control situations of increasing unrest, such as the protests over the zero COVID policy, unpaid arrears, or the threat of political opposition by minority groups such as in the Xinjiang region.²⁴ They could also take on a more adversarial posture toward the United States as a way of managing internal pressures or divisions, which could lead to vicious cycles both internally and externally.

Fragility in the West

Finally, previously overlooked areas of structural fragility have surfaced within Western democracies themselves, especially the United States over the last several years as reflected in the Fragile States Index. The average score for the FSI's Factionalized Elites indicator has steadily worsened among the Economist Intelligence Unit's 30 most democratic nations in the world.²⁵ In some countries this has been accompanied by a worsening in Group Grievance, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Sweden, Spain, and Czech Republic. Overall, the score in the Cohesion indicators (Factionalized Elites, Group Grievance, and Security Apparatus) worsened steadily in the average top 30 most democratic nations from 2007 to 2020 before slowly starting to come back down. However, stresses remain extremely high by historical standards, and the United States is by far the most worsened within this group. In 2022, amidst continued political polarization, gridlock, and brinksmanship, the United States had the highest number of mass shootings ever recorded in a single year, according to a Mother Jones investigation, at schools, workplaces, places of workshop, and neighborhoods.²⁶ This creates vulnerability to a potential shock. Because even if a country is not fragile, if cohesion has worsened steadily over a

decade, then when a shock such as a global pandemic eventually does hit, that country may not have the social capital necessary to mobilize the collective response to manage the crisis and prevent it from cascading across the social, economic, political, and security indicators.

To the extent that the Great Powers are moving into a time of increased competition, the FSI presents a warning that we must not forget to also look at the world through the lens of fragility, both in international affairs and at home. There are always tradeoffs in policy. And if winning the game of power and influence is achieved at the expense of the promotion of dignity, resilience, governance, and livelihoods for the most vulnerable, then crisis will compound, and in the end everyone will lose.



Cascading Fragility: From Ukraine to the World



UKRAINE

TOTAL SCORE
FSI SCORE 2023

95.9

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2023

18th

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

+27.30

(POINTS SINCE 2022)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

+23.30

(POINTS SINCE 2018)

LONG-TERM
TREND

+30.0

(POINTS SINCE 2013)

Daniel Woodburn

Emily Sample

In the wake the Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine’s 2023 Fragile States Index (FSI) score has risen from 68.6 to 95.9, skyrocketing the country’s ranking from the 92nd most fragile to 18th, claiming the unenviable title of “Most Worsened” for the year. Furthermore, Ukraine’s increased fragility has affected not just countries in its vicinity, but states far further afield.

Aspects of this cascading fragility are clear-cut and have been researched and discussed at length, like the major impact on the global wheat, sunflower oil, and maize supply, and the subsequent effects on food security and aid in countries like Ethiopia.¹ Similarly, the invasion has resulted in an energy crisis, not least because Ukraine’s allies have sought to divest from Russian energy as quickly as possible.² Skyrocketing prices of natural gas and crude oil have increased pressure not only on poorer countries, but the poorest citizens of wealthy countries who cannot absorb rising costs.³ The most visual example is the massive flow of Ukrainian refugees fleeing to Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia, and then spreading across the world;⁴ Poland’s Refugees and IDPs indicator score rose from 2.5 in 2022 to 5.9 in 2023.⁵

In a world of modern, irregular, and hybrid warfare, there are

comparatively few recent examples of outright, state-on-state invasions, with those of Iraq and Afghanistan serving as exceptions to prove the rule. Apart from the United States and NATO, other major powers, such as Russia and China, have until now prioritized less kinetic means, such as cyber-attacks, and economic measures like the Belt-and-Road initiative, while maintaining an official policy of supporting state sovereignty as an inviolable principle of international affairs.⁶ As for China’s more hawkish posture in and around the South China Sea – especially Taiwan – the unfolding of the Ukraine war carries considerable implications, with the potential risk of underestimating a small nation’s capabilities or the commitment of the West to support it. Under President Biden, the U.S.’s historical support of Taiwan has been further underscored.⁷ In August 2022, Nancy Pelosi, the then-speaker of the US House of Representatives, provoked Chinese outrage by visiting the island nation, representing the highest-level U.S. visit in 25 years, leading to a flurry of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises in the Taiwanese strait in the weeks following Pelosi’s visit, and overt military threats.⁸

The Ukrainian war occurred in a context of historical Russian expansionism. Russia previously invaded Georgia in 2008 (leading to an 8-point Georgian decline in the 2009 FSI) and Crimea in 2014 (leading to a 9.1 worsening in the 2015 FSI for Ukraine). Where the Georgia-Russian war was over in five days with a quick and successful intervention from Russia in

favor of the separatist South Ossetian and Abkhazian self-proclaimed republics, Ukraine's resistance in 2022 has led to a protracted conflict that has reshaped its society and led to a worsening in all but one of its 12 FSI indicators (the sole improvement being State Legitimacy). Ukraine's scores are the highest possible (10) in External Intervention, Refugees and IDPs, and Security Apparatus, while several others are at 8 or above. In comparison, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia precipitated a series of mass protests against the government, as well as against Russian interference – which to this day continue to translate to high scores in Factionalized Elite, Group Grievance, and State Legitimacy.⁹ However, in the aggregate, Georgia returned to its pre-war baseline over the next five years, and is now almost 12 points better off than it was on the eve of the invasion, though protests remain commonplace.

Ukraine's poor 2023 score on the Fragile States Index belies its remarkable resistance. In February 2022, as Russia advanced on Kyiv, Ukraine appeared to be on the verge of a swift military defeat. By April 2022, however, Ukraine's forces had expelled the Russian military from the capital; 5 months later, Russia had no significant northern theater of operations, and fighting was concentrated in the south and east, along the Black Sea and Azov Sea coasts.¹⁰ As of early June 2023, the world watches as a second major Ukrainian counter-offensive unfolds. After the success of its autumn counter-offensive in 2022, a Ukrainian victory appeared less and less fanciful.¹¹ History is rife with examples of underdogs prevailing against bigger, better-equipped, more organized opponents, and Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to absorb, adapt, and transform in numerous ways.^{12 13} During the [launch](#) of the State Resilience Index, the Fund for Peace highlighted Ukraine's decentralization as a key element in its successes to date.¹⁴ In early June 2023, Ukraine's Minister for Economy hailed a smaller-than-

expected GDP contraction in the first quarter of 2023.¹⁵ This resilience is mirrored by Ukrainian workers, who have to contend with frequent power cuts resulting from Russian targeting of critical infrastructure. Shops, cafés, and restaurants remain resolutely open even in cities pummeled by Russian rockets, keeping the lights on with generators.¹⁶ In Kyiv, the opera house has continued putting on shows, albeit for reduced crowds in order to fit patrons into its bomb shelters. Ukraine's sizeable IT sector – one of its bigger export-earners prior to the war – continues to function thanks to co-working spaces touting back-up generators, wi-fi points, and bomb shelters equipped with furniture and internet access to ensure continuity.¹⁷ Air raid sirens have become commonplace in cities across Ukraine, yet civilian life goes on. On the battlefield, Ukraine is requisitioning junkyards and garages to repair damaged tanks.¹⁸

In spite of this resilience, the fragility that has emanated from Ukraine and cascaded globally has come at significant cost, both direct and indirect. This includes the sudden reassignment of funding and programming to Ukraine and its refugees.¹⁹ Other countries that are also in crisis, including Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia, may face a humanitarian aid shortfall as critical funding and supplies are redirected toward Ukraine. For countries already experiencing fragility, or on the cusp, this rerouting of funding and global attention has left a gap through which people in these fragile contexts will slip. It also leaves a vacuum for others to fill, including violent extremist groups and paramilitary outfits like Russia's Wagner Group. These populations face starvation, malnutrition, and health emergencies, as well as their subsequent impacts on conflict, migration, and political legitimacy. As the world continues to navigate Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ways it affects the globe, fragility still matters in countries all over the world, now more than ever.



Incentivizing Peace Only Leads to More War in Sudan



Emily Sample

Reem Abbas

Reem Abbas is a writer and researcher. Her book “(Un)Doing Resistance: Authoritarianism and Attacks on the Arts in Sudan’s 30 Years of Islamist Rule” was published by Andariya

Consistently in the top ten most fragile countries, the hope brought by the 2019 coup has since been dampened by the continued cycle of unstable governance. This has escalated even further in 2023 as the tentative alliance between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary force, collapsed violently in April. While this most recent coup is not reflected in this year’s Fragile States Index, it is illustrative of the wider pattern of sustained fragility that has plagued Sudan.

Similar to the 2019 ousting of Omar Al-Bashir, the October 2021 coup was executed from the inside. Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leaders of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), respectively, worked in tandem to cut the civilian transitional government out of power and establish their own co-rule. Despite months of promises to build a joint military and civilian government, the citizens of Sudan were once more made voiceless in official governing. Unlike the years under Al-Bashir, though, the citizenry would not be cowed into total silence. Protests, mostly peaceful, continued in Khartoum, reminding

Hemedti and al-Burhan that they would not be allowed to lead Sudan quietly into another authoritarian rule. In his book “When Peace Kills Politics: International Intervention and Unending Wars in the Sudans,”¹ Sharath Srinivasan argues that the certain types of peace agreements instead instigate never-ending war because they reward armed groups while stymying civilian-led and non-violent participations that is critical to ending violence and establishing governance. This has been central to Sudan’s persistent fragility.

Sudan’s post-colonial history is a series of conflicts and subsequent shoddy peace agreements between the central government and regional armed groups. Even armed groups that start with a clear manifesto and sets of policy documents highlighting their goals and grievances concerning economic and political marginalization for the populations they represent, ultimately agree to peace agreements that are in fact power-sharing agreements that benefit the top ranks of the armed groups.

In 2006, the former government of Omar Al-Bashir was simultaneously implementing three major peace agreements. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to end Africa’s longest-running war while the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), known as the Abuja Agreement, was signed with the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Minni

Minawi and several armed groups from the Darfur region. At the same time, it was implementing the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) with the Beja Front and the Rashaida Free Lions.²

The peace agreements have failed to consolidate power in the center and they have also failed to enable the national army to monopolize violence, which is critical to the stabilization of the state. In fact, the peace agreements led to further splintering of the armed groups as well as of the state itself through two critical ramifications. Firstly, they lead to more conflict and polarization. The ESPA for example transformed the conflict in Eastern Sudan from a “low intensity conflict to a complex conflict replete with tribal politics.”³

Secondly, they inspired more armed groups who joined the fight to gain positions and benefits provided through the power-sharing agreements. The DPA for example led to the splintering of Darfuri armed groups and this continued even when the Doha Peace Process for Darfur (DDPD) was signed in 2011, another attempt to bring peace to Sudan. And yet, by late 2019, there were over 80 known armed groups in Darfur. Hottinger argued that the DPA led to fragmentation of both the armed groups and the communities in Darfur and led to in-fighting between the armed groups.⁴ Literature on Sudan’s failed peace agreements has argued that root causes of conflict were never addressed and instead the parties “get locked into debating who gets what when it comes to power sharing.”⁵ This translates into ongoing insecurity on the ground, uneven development, marginalization, and discrimination, which themselves fail to be interrogated and addressed.⁶

The emergence of Hemedti and the RSF have deep roots in decades of failed peace agreements and militarization by the central government of the peripheries to join their counterinsurgencies. Hemedti’s career transpired in the

backdrop of the DPA when in 2007, he began to express his grievances against the central government and decided to fight on the side of the armed groups by creating his own armed group.

As with other armed groups, Hemedti was lured back by the central government, rewarded with an army rank and money. At the time, this was possible by the oil money which allowed Al-Bashir to expand Sudan’s political marketplace. In the post-2019 period, the state continued to manipulate the slogans of the revolution to reward Hemedti for his supposed siding with the revolution and it also rewarded the armed groups in Darfur and in the new South Sudan through the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). The level of violence seen after the revolution and the signing of the JPA was unprecedented and displacement continued to grow in Darfur, Blue Nile and other parts of Sudan. This violence came to a head once more in April 2023 when Hemedti and the RSF were negotiating the process of integrating into the SAF through the framework agreement, a process led by the international community.

Conflicts in Sudan show clear regional divisions. In addition to a Fractionalized Elites score that has never dipped below a 9.1, Sudan has a Group Grievance score that is only now reflective of its lowest ever score, a 9.3, which will almost undoubtedly increase again next year based on the current crisis. These two scores are illustrative of a highly divided society who have had to turn to other means of support and protection when the government is either unwilling or unable to provide safety and stability. As a result, fissures have deepened across Sudan, where ethnicity, race, and religion have been factors in grouping ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ The state has low legitimacy in the South and Western Sudan; this translated into taking up arms against the state and in some cases, declaring “free territory” within Sudan. Kauda for example, a small town in South Kordofan state is controlled by the SPLM/A (North Sudan

faction) and is called liberated land as in liberated from the supposed occupation by the central government. This shows the deep extent of alienation between the central government and the periphery, an alienation perpetrated by colonial policies and borders and further deepened through policies by the post-colonial military governments.

As the RSF and Sudanese army negotiate a tentative ceasefire, the international community has the opportunity to bring peacebuilders to the negotiating table, and not continue the cycle of rewarding those who wage war. There is hope for Sudan to not spend the next 18 years as one of the top ten most fragile states, as it has the last, but only if the Sudanese citizens are able to regain their stake—and their trust—in the government.



An Elusive Search for Stability in Burkina Faso as France Takes a Big Step Back



Billy Agwanda

Until 2015, Burkina Faso, a landlocked West African country with a population of 22 million, remained untouched by the array of jihadist groups operating in the Sahel. Prior to 2015, it was even considered to be an 'island of stability'. Analysts and researchers opined that with its history of religious tolerance, Burkina Faso would be relatively insulated from the fragmented jihadi coalitions operating in neighboring countries such as Mali.¹ However, according to the 2023 Global Terrorism Index Report, Burkina Faso has become a focal point of the crisis in the Sahel, ranking second behind Afghanistan and two places above Mali.² The cumulative impact of this instability is reflected in the 2023 Fragile State Index (FSI), in which Burkina Faso recorded its highest score in the 18-year history of the Index, ranking 21st with 94 points out of a possible maximum of 120. Across the 12 indicators captured by the Index, Burkina Faso's situation deteriorated in 10.

Due to an increasing frequency of deadly attacks, the Burkinabé military has been involved since 2015 in counterinsurgency operations against extremist groups that occupy pockets of ungoverned territory. It is believed that the government controls slightly over 50% of the country's territory, though the actual figure could be even lower. In addition, it is estimated that the number of attacks by extremists increased throughout the year such that by December of 2022, over 1,135 people had been killed, which is

a 50% more than the total fatalities recorded in 2021, while more than 2 million people had been displaced.^{3,4}

In 2022, Burkina Faso experienced two coups within a single year (January and September) — critical developments that exacerbated the already fragile political and economic environment in the country. In March, Lieutenant Colonel Paul -Henri Damiba, the leader of the coup in January, was sworn in as the transitional government's president after the detention and deposition of President Christian Kaboré, the dissolution of parliament and government, and the establishment of a military Junta.⁵ Reports highlight that the January coup was welcomed on the domestic front, as large crowds were witnessed in Ouagadougou's national square celebrating the coup by playing music, singing, blowing horns and dancing.⁶ These celebrations were said to point to a feeling of reprieve occasioned by the decline in public confidence in the government's counterinsurgency efforts. However, on the international front, the coup was strongly condemned as illegitimate. Burkina Faso was quickly suspended from the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*.^{7,8,9}

Then, Burkina Faso experienced a second coup less than nine months later in September, when a 34-year-old army captain, Ibrahim Traoré, ousted Damiba. Similar to his predecessor, Mr. Traoré justified the coup on the basis of the deteriorating

security situation resulting from the growing threat of jihadist-inspired terrorism. The September coup was triggered by an attack on September 26 by al-Qaeda linked jihadists on a 150-truck convoy carrying food to Djibo, one of the major cities in the war-torn north, and which resulted in the death of 37 people, of which 27 were soldiers.¹⁰ The city of 60,000 people had been under siege by terror groups for 18 months. Upon taking power, Traoré announced plans to create six new rapid intervention units and recruit 50,000 civilians as army auxiliaries to support the counterinsurgency efforts. Given that the coup occurred within the military, which was already running the country following the January coup, no significant public reaction was observed on the domestic front. However, the international community once again condemned the coup and countries such as the United States took additional punitive measures such as reducing aid by \$160 million and removing Burkina Faso from a bilateral trade facilitation program.¹¹ After the Ibrahim Traoré's inauguration in October, a transitional period was established under a Transition Charter, to be managed by a civilian prime minister - Joachim Kyelem, and a transitional legislative assembly. The Charter established a 24-month timeline culminating in 2024, when constitutional order is expected to be restored.

The perceived shortcomings of the Burkinabé military in the face of the jihadist insurgency threat led to the establishment of self-defense militias in affected areas. These operate unchecked and unsupervised, contributing to the perpetration of acts of violence against civilians, including killings and massacres. A report by Human Rights Watch highlighted that significant human rights violations were observed, including unlawful, extrajudicial, and arbitrary killings by security forces, state-sponsored militias, and extremist groups.¹² The Report also noted other issues such as corruption, lack of accountability for gender-based violence, inhumane prison conditions, restrictions on free expression, violence against journalists, and human rights abuses in local conflicts. Finally,

crimes that involved violence or threats of violence directed at members of national, racial, and ethnic minorities were also reported.

As a consequence of the strains created by social and political dynamics, Burkina Faso's economic development regressed in 2022. Although the economy had registered a robust 6.9% recovery in 2021, the growth rate slowed down to 2.5% in 2022. This was partly driven by low productivity in the mining sector, which recorded a 4.9% contraction in 2022 as a result of the closure of several mines for security reasons.¹³ In the 2023 FSI, Burkina Faso's highest level of pressure was in the Security Apparatus indicator, with a score of 9.3 out of 10. This is the highest score for the indicator since the beginning of the FSI in 2006.

The departure of French military forces from Mali in August 2022, making the end of a nearly decade-long military presence, perhaps represented the most significant transformation of the security dynamics in the Sahel. French counterterrorism operations had constituted a vital deterrence to jihadist groups, who were often compelled to adopt covert methods to avoid detection by drones and planes, refraining from using phones, reducing group sizes, and only coordinating minimally. However, the withdrawal of French troops from Mali in particular has had a far-reaching impact in the whole region, including in countries such as Burkina Faso, because it has created the perception of a power vacuum and emboldened jihadists to perpetrate violence against civilians, government officials, and security forces.

In 2022, France experienced strained relations with Mali, leading to the eviction of the French ambassador to Mali in January 2022, and subsequently resulting in France's withdrawal from the country.^{14 15} Since then, in Burkina Faso, there was also an increase of popular anti-France sentiment, and the junta

regime demanded the withdrawal of French forces, which they did in February 2023.¹⁶ In their absence, reports have indicated that the Russian mercenary Wagner Group may seek to fill the vacuum.^{17 18} The Wagner Group has shown limited effectiveness in combating jihadist organizations in Africa. In Mozambique, for example, they suffered significant defeats at the hands of the Islamic State Central African Province and were forced to withdraw in November 2015 from the Cabo Delgado province.^{19 20}

And compared to the French forces, Wagner troops are logistically fewer, less experienced, and less well-equipped for an effective counterinsurgency. Since the arrival of Wagner in December 2021 in Mali, there has been a surge in violence against civilians. One of the most egregious incidents occurred in late March 2022, when Wagner troops carried out a five-day siege in the central Malian town of Moura resulting in the massacre of over 300 civilians.²¹

As Western powers begin to disengage from places like Afghanistan and the Sahel, in favor of other geopolitical priorities, the question of what is left behind and who fills the gap remains a pressing concern. One way or another, the challenges of governance, poverty, and violent extremism must be confronted through security, social, political, and economic development strategies. Fragility still matters.



Guyana – A Wellspring of Potential



Melinda Ellington

Despite a history of turbulent politics, ethnic divisions, and fractious relationships with neighbors, Guyana has the potential to become one of the biggest success stories of the decade. The discovery of oil fields has flooded the nation with resources that could improve public services, civic participation, and economic development, lifting tens of thousands out of poverty. However, as history has shown repeatedly, a sudden influx of wealth can pose significant risks in countries without inclusive institutions, good governance, and sustainable policies. Since the discovery of oil in 2015, Guyana has experienced declining fragility, and the ensuing economic boom has made it one of the most improved countries on the Fragile States Index in 2023. However, economic growth alone is not enough to create a sustainable reduction in fragility. The nation’s long-term development will depend on its ability to navigate political challenges, take advantage of its resource wealth, and make investments in its future.

As a former British colony, Guyana faced many political, economic, and governmental challenges. After gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1966, Guyana experienced a period of instability, with crises shaking the country’s institutions to a breaking point characterized by political violence along ethnic and racial divides and mass emigration.¹ Guyana’s political scene has been primarily dominated by the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and

People’s National Congress (PNC), founded and led by charismatic leaders Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham respectively.² Under the PNC and Burnham, communist economic policies led to poor economic performance and massive debt accumulation.³ Then, despite the transition to more progressive economic policy under Jagan and the PPP, Guyana still experienced political polarization, corruption, and lacking economic opportunity, resulting in the exodus of skilled laborers.⁴ Instability in the early stages of independence contributed to a bleak future, with persistently high Human Flight and Brain Drain scores on the Fragile States Index from the first edition in 2007. The absence of effective policy intervention, adequate public infrastructure, and economic opportunity for much of the population resulted in expanding poverty across the nation. These factors combined led to Guyana starting the 2010s as one of the poorest countries in the region with the highest suicide rate in the world.⁵

Opportunities and Threats

Guyana’s lackluster trajectory rapidly shifted with the discovery of rich offshore oil deposits by ExxonMobile in 2015.⁶ These oil fields dwarf other recent discoveries, positioning Guyana to compete with the three largest producers worldwide, the U.S., Norway, and Mexico, and to surpass Kuwait as the highest producer of oil per-capita in the world.⁷ In 2022, Guyana experienced a staggering 57.8% economic growth,^{8,9} with public debt and inflation holding steady, despite much of the rest of the world struggling to stabilize their economies in 2022. Even when taking away oil

income, Guyana reports that their economic growth is still in the top 5 nations worldwide – non-oil sector growth is projected to grow by 9.5% in 2023, due to the government’s dedication to diversifying economic outputs.¹⁰

Despite these incredible opportunities, the challenges that Guyana must overcome are immense. Decades of impoverishment and neglect have left the nation’s infrastructure in dire need of an overhaul, and 48% of the population remain in poverty.¹¹ While improving, the country continues to exhibit a negative migration rate, with many skilled laborers and highly educated individuals living abroad and sending remittances home, accounting for 7% of GDP.¹² Racial, political, and economic class divides continue to be reflected in the rural-urban divide,^{13 14} leaving large ethnic and geographic enclaves underrepresented. Politicians of the PPP-C party have stated their desire to work for all Guyanese citizens and collaborate with the second-largest coalition, comprising A Partnership for National Unity (APNU) and Alliance for Change (AFC). However, those statements have yet to materialize in the form of concrete policies.¹⁵ Anti-corruption and transparency measures across the government are inconsistently applied, increasing Guyana’s vulnerability to corruption as government resources expand.¹⁶ Though Guyana’s resource wealth stands to change its development trajectory, significant challenges remain in the political landscape. Short-term financial gains need to be safeguarded against mismanagement and corruption if long-term sustainable growth is to be attained.

Environmental sustainability is also a central challenge for Guyana’s growth moving forward. Despite receiving accolades for their efforts in forest preservation,^{17 18} pollution resulting from some unregulated mining projects and a newfound dependence on oil income have put pressure on the nation’s dedication to environmentally friendly policies.¹⁹ With almost 90% of the population living along the coast and promised

increases in oil production,^{20 21} Guyana faces the challenge of pursuing growth at the expense of the section of its population vulnerable to climate disasters. A 2020 report on Guyana’s National Drought Mitigation and Adaptation Plan and two 2021 UN briefs on the impacts of climate change on different demographic groups show an ongoing pattern of rural-to-urban migration in response to climate change disasters.^{22 23 24} The government’s pattern of a reactive, crisis-mitigation approach to the effects of climate change needs to be adapted to a proactive, risk-management strategy, if there is any hope of comprehensive planning for a population increasingly exposed to droughts, flooding, and future sea-level rise.²⁵

Investment in Infrastructure

These challenges have been recognized by Guyana’s government, and planning is beginning to take shape to strengthen the small nation’s chances of success, boosting its score on the 2023 FSI. Maintaining that positive trajectory, however, will require follow-through on the ambitious promises being made by the current administration.

Investment in public infrastructure will be one of the most critical long-term investments that Guyana must make to support sustainable growth in the country. With almost 85% of the country’s landmass covered in forests,²⁶ access to the interior remains limited. Massive investments into improved roadways within the country and connecting to neighboring Brazil are underway,²⁷ with the aim to improve efficiency of transportation and regional trade. A new deepwater port that can service neighboring Suriname is also in development, promising the potential of a new regional trade hub.²⁸ To counteract the environmental impacts of these projects, Guyana has also pledged to increase investment in renewable energy. Debates surrounding long-planned hydroelectric plants are ongoing and a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Norwegian Agency for Development

Cooperation is set to jumpstart the country's solar power aspiration.^{29 30} The government has also heeded the needs of the population and begun to invest heavily in the nation's educational system and healthcare infrastructure.^{31 32} Plans to improve quality of life and become a net exporter of health and education services have the potential to boost the region's access to these services, in addition to Guyana's own citizens.

The government's investment in public services and infrastructure like healthcare and education will be critical building blocks for a thriving country that can support the rapid growth we expect to see over the next few years. Equally important will be the diversification of income streams to ensure that Guyana doesn't become overly dependent on oil as a single commodity export at the expense of other sectors, as so many contemporaries have. In addition to continuation of their expansion of sustainable timber farming,³³ Guyana has an established industry in bauxite, gold, and sandstone production that could be further developed by leveraging aluminum processing in-country.³⁴ While preliminary steps are being taken to strengthen a diverse array of industries, only a consistent commitment to this economic planning will result in long-term gains.

In an effort to avoid the pitfall of corruption and short-sighted investing, the Natural Resource Fund (NRF) was created to manage the financial windfall of Guyana's oil reserves.³⁵ Overseen by the Bank of Guyana, this process seeks to leverage the excess income of natural resources to improve overall quality of life for the citizens through forward-thinking investments in infrastructure, a green economy, and public services. This model has been used by many other nations but has not been without its flaws. An opaque series of policies and rotating officials overseeing the fund run the risk of corruption and inappropriate spending.³⁶ Frequently, nations with otherwise comprehensive social and economic development

plans fall prey to individuals and governments seeking to maximize their own profit over the long-term health of the nation. Strengthening anti-corruption and transparency laws will be decisive in Guyana's success.

Too often have developing nations fallen into the trap of the Resource Curse, growing too quickly, and fostering cronyism and a reliance on a single industry. Guyana's leadership is aware of the pitfalls that await if they are not careful— they are, after all, neighbors to Venezuela.³⁷ The first years of Guyana's oil boom have shown a nation eager to implement reforms across sectors to ensure sustainable growth for all members of society. Time will tell if a long-term commitment to reform and development overcomes pernicious short-term incentives. With good leadership, the right policies, and a steady eye on the lessons from other oil rich countries, Guyana will be able to forge ahead and reap the benefits of their windfall for inclusive development and unprecedented opportunity for the population as a whole. It is also in the interest of oil companies themselves to invest strategically in corporate social enterprise, and for impact investors to promote an enabling environment for peaceable livelihoods before it is too late, and Guyana becomes another cautionary tale.



L'Etat, C'est (Pas) Moi: France's Mistifying Improvement on the Fragile States Index



Daniel Woodburn

On its surface France may appear to be a country in turmoil, even decline, rocked by regular protests and an increasingly polarized political landscape.¹ Popular discourse of increasing state authoritarianism and declining public services would seemingly place it in the company of the United States under President Trump, and would even conjure comparisons with Turkey under an increasingly authoritarian Erdoğan. A street poll would likely yield vitriol directed at President Macron, the likes of which will have been witnessed in Turkey over the course of the 2023 General Election and President Erdoğan's re-election bid. So how is it that France's overall FSI score is the best it has been since before the 2008 financial crisis, continuing a long-term trend of gradual progress, no less?

Populist, President Macron is not, let alone popular. Statistically, he is as close to universally disliked as any French president has ever been during France's fifth Republic, dating back to 1958.² Yet his awful approval ratings belie a underlying, if reluctant recognition that his unpopular policies may be necessary, the most recent and explosive of which was the increase of the full-pension retirement age from 62 to 64, prompting protracted and often violent protests.³ President Macron did himself no favors by bypassing a parliamentary vote and forcing the reform through with a little-used presidential decree mechanism, adding further fuel to the fire and cries for a new Republic, underscored by a new constitution that strips the president of many of his or her far-reaching powers.⁴ But

Macron seems to have few aspirations to ingratiate himself with the French public, especially now that he is in his second (and last) 5-year term. His approach and demeanor are criticized as haughty, even "Jupitarian" by the French public. He set about implementing his ambitious presidential project upon being elected in 2017, targeting the streamlining of the French state and a business-centric approach to making France a competitive alternative to the likes of Germany for investors.⁵ In the early days of his presidency, this entailed simplifying France's complex labor code, cutting red tape, and stripping certain public servants' generous benefits, prompting protests from two of the country's largest unions, and growing solidarity amongst the general public with Macron's apparent victims.⁶ The zenith came in 2018, when an environmentally-minded reform increasing fuel tax sparked the yellow vest movement, typified by mass protests drawing hundreds of thousands onto the streets and lasting well into 2019.⁷

Examples of unpopular reforms abound, and each one adds to the paradox of a steadily improving FSI score. Despite the air of general pessimism that currently reigns over France, the country is in surprisingly good shape. Where other countries may have been unable to fully recover from the financial crash, letting public services and the standard of living steadily erode,⁸ the past six years have seen a trend towards French pragmatism and efficiency, both domestically and on the world stage. Macron's streamlining of France's cumbersome and generous welfare system has predictably been met with anger

and resistance.⁹ However, the French continue to benefit from greater state largesse than the vast majority of the country's OECD counterparts: in 2019, France spent almost double the OECD average on social protection expenditures (23.9% vs 13.3%), almost in joint-first place with Finland – the FSI's perennial least fragile state – on 24%.¹⁰ As of June 2023, unemployment is at a historical low: the figure of 7.1% hadn't been seen in over five decades, and as a statistic is made all the more remarkable in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹¹ Meanwhile, France is fighting tooth and nail to resist a trend befalling its cross-channel neighbor – the United Kingdom – which is to say of dwindling significance and influence on the world stage, and has stepped into the breach left by the UK following Brexit and its departure from the European Union. In contrast, Macron has been at pains to demonstrate that he is interested in cooperation first and foremost, and that a European Union led by France and Germany in tandem is a European Union capable of rivalling the likes of Russia, China and the United States, and resisting incursions, whatever forms these take.¹²

It follows that on the world stage, Macron has attempted to balance European independence with France's various import-related needs involving the great powers, such as gas from Russia, technological goods from China, and security guarantees from the United States.¹³ This balancing act, which in its extreme would translate to reckless nationalistic protectionism, has pushed Macron, whether willingly or not, to vie with Germany for leadership within Europe – a mantle that both countries have historically shown themselves reluctant to take on.¹⁴ In adopting this role, Macron has repeatedly argued that Europe is itself a great power that needs a unified approach to contending with Russia, China and US global influence. This is particularly visible in his repeated reference to "European values."¹⁵ Until 2022, it was also evident in France's leadership in the Sahel, and the significant resources it committed to the counterinsurgency efforts across the region.

In the face of a European reluctance to contribute, as well as increasing anti-French sentiments across the Sahel, France wound down its near-decade-long military operation in the Sahel in November 2022, and all but left Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger to face the growing violent extremist threats by themselves, leaving a breach for the Russian mercenary outfit, Wagner, to step in and fill.¹⁶ This arguably represented a key turning point in France's geopolitical priorities, away from *Françafrique* – France's traditional sphere of influence in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa – and towards China and Russia. Where other European Union countries' ties to Russia were laid bare following the invasion, it is telling that France's external intervention score on the FSI has steadily dropped from 2.0 in 2016 – just before Macron's presidency, when accusations of Russian meddling in democratic countries' votes were rife – to a historical low of 0.5 in the 2023 edition of the Index.

Improvements on the FSI overall do not negate the real challenges faced by France, particularly the Group Grievance score, which has hovered between 5.6 and 7.0 for the duration of the FSI's 18-year history, landing at 6.4 in 2023, reflecting elevated levels of social stress and discontent. However, statistically, the French state is functioning as well as it ever has, even as protests continue to gain momentum with each new controversial reform. In a democracy, an unpopular president need not translate into a bad State Legitimacy score, because unlike under King Louis XIV, "*L'Etat n'est pas moi*"; the president is not the State. Macron has just under four years of his second term left. The odds are stacked against him to improve on his low approval ratings, especially as he feels he has little to lose and will press on as best he can with his unpopular reform agenda.

The irony of France – and its FSI score – being in good health is that the massive unpopularity of the reforms at the root of this good health has strengthened the hand of previously fringe

political actors, chiefly Marine le Pen and her far-right *Rassemblement National* (National Rally) party. Mr. Macron won his first presidential run-off against Ms. le Pen comfortably in 2017, however the gap narrowed significantly in their 2022 rematch.¹⁷ Among other things, Mr. Macron is accused of gutting the center ground of the French political landscape, leading to the rising popularity of figures like Ms. le Pen and the hard-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon.¹⁸ Mr. Mélenchon, whose abrasive and no-nonsense personality have endeared him to many young voters, may not run again in 2027, when he will be 75.¹⁹ Ms. Le Pen, however, has overseen a dramatic improvement in the fortunes of a party that was previously deemed too radical, including through a rebrand that has made the *Rassemblement National's* image far more palatable to voters. Distaste for Macron was not sufficiently pronounced for a Le Pen victory in 2022, though she significantly narrowed the gap from a 34 percentage point margin to 18 in the 2017 and 2022 run-offs.

Come 2027, Macron will be unable to run for a third term, and the traditional two-party hegemony of the left-wing Socialist and right-wing Republican parties appear to be a thing of the past. A paradox of Macron's success in reforming France and attempting to prepare the European Union for the rigors of a three-way global struggle between Russia, the US and China, is that he appears to have widened the path to a potential Marine le Pen victory. Though she stepped down as leader of the party in November 2022, barring an act of God, she will be the *Rassemblement National's* candidate for the 2027 presidential elections.²⁰ Under her presidency, France could rapidly turn to a more populist, less technocratic form of governance, and turn in on itself rather than try to show the way for a European Union capable of contending with and rivalling the great powers.²¹ If France proves anything, it is that addressing factors of fragility is difficult; future-proofing a country against fragility is harder still.



Whiplash in Türkiye: Promise and Fragility



Ayça Kiriş

After 100 years of independence, the Republic of Türkiye is veering toward greater fragility. When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power over 20 years ago, Türkiye was emerging as a bulwark of stability in the region. It was consolidating liberal and democratic values, improving human rights, reducing the influence of the military in politics, and making progress on the EU ascension process.¹ However, in the last 18 years, Türkiye has been spiking on the Fragile States Index, threatening the potential it showed in the early 2000s, and undermining the promise of an economic boom following the financial crisis.² Now, instead, there has been an intensification of group grievances, a continuously shrinking civil society, a worsening human rights record and a collapse of the economy. The downward trajectory of the economy and of the state's legitimacy now place Türkiye among the most prominent examples of democratic backsliding, and as a cautionary tale against government meddling in monetary policy. In 2014, the value of the Turkish Lira against the U.S. Dollar was 2.18,³ only to suddenly lose a third of its value over the course of a month in 2018.⁴ After Erdoğan's reelection in May 2023, the Turkish central bank finally relented and signaled the abandonment of an unorthodox monetary policy, though significant damage had already been wrought. As of June 2023, the exchange rate is 20.81 Lira to the dollar,⁵ a new record low.

Türkiye's economy is struggling. The inflation rate has reached

double digits for the last 6 years, and in 2022 almost triple, at 83.45%.⁶ In March 2023, the unemployment rate was 10%,⁷ while close to 1 in 3 Turks live below the poverty line.⁸ In December 2022, it was announced that the official monthly minimum wage in 2023 would rise to 8,506.80 Lira.⁹ But this is not a living wage. In January, research showed that the starvation line in Türkiye was 8,782 Lira, and the poverty line 30,379 Lira.¹⁰ Currently, Türkiye also has the highest rate of youth not in employment, education or training (NEET) among OECD countries.¹¹ In March 2023, Türkiye's S&P sovereign credit rating was downgraded from stable to negative.

Türkiye's economic decline did not occur overnight, nor is the diminishing value of the Turkish Lira in 2022 a complete surprise. The deterioration of economic trends can be traced back to 2011, slowly building to an economic crisis in 2018 and descending into a fully-fledged depression in 2020, triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. The reasons for the collapse of the Turkish Lira are many, but one of the prominent ones is the unconventional policy of keeping interest rates low despite skyrocketing inflation rates.¹² Considering Türkiye's chronic account deficit problem, the stated goal behind the policy was to guarantee a steady surplus of foreign trade volume with the help of an undervalued currency.¹³ However, this policy fell short of improving Türkiye's current account deficit, as exports stayed low, and the volume of imports actually increased. Economic actors, apprehensive of Ankara's economic policies, stockpiled to shelter themselves from increasing prices.¹⁴ And Russia's invasion of Ukraine

subsequently hit the Turkish economy at the worst possible time, affecting global supply chains while increasing the price of energy and other commodities that Türkiye imports in large quantities.¹⁵ Russia ranked 2nd in Türkiye's imports and 10th in its export in 2021, making it an essential trade partner.¹⁶ Likewise, Türkiye's imports from Ukraine reached \$4.5 billion in 2021, while its exports surged to \$2.9 billion; these plummeted to almost zero in 2022 following the invasion.¹⁷ In light of the rapid increase in poverty, dwindling prospects and absence of hope for the future, many Turkish youth, especially the most educated, have begun to leave the country in search of better opportunities abroad.¹⁸

In stark contrast to the domestic challenges President Erdoğan has been facing, his aspiration to position Türkiye as a regional power and strengthen its standing on the international stage has been focused and sustained. Military engagement in countries such as Libya, Iraq, and Syria and a strong presence in Somalia, coupled with the supply of drones to Ethiopia, are only a few examples of President Erdoğan's determination to expand Türkiye's footprint and influence globally.¹⁹ To that end, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provided him with the opportunity to enhance Türkiye's international stance. President Erdoğan was keen to position Türkiye as the peace-broker, and in the early months of the invasion, rounds of negotiations took place in Istanbul and Antalya.²⁰ Even as the Russian invasion of Ukraine progressed, Türkiye maintained its neutral stance and steadfastly withstood Western pressure to impose sanctions on Russia.²¹ In July 2022, Ankara helped the UN reach an agreement with Russia and Ukraine to allow grain shipments from Ukrainian ports, mitigating the impact of the global food crisis,²² Türkiye's role as the mediator granted it a degree of freedom in refraining from siding with either Ukraine or Russia. Last but not least, Türkiye wielded influence within NATO by demanding the extradition of Kurdish rebels in exchange for its blessing on Sweden and Finland's membership bids.²³

Throughout 2022, Türkiye's already worrying Human Rights record continued to be a concern, with its corresponding FSI score remaining high at 8.0 points in the 2023 Index. Freedom of expression, association, and assembly had already been sharply eroded under the AKP's rule. In October, in the run-up to the 2023 general elections, a law was enacted to criminalize the dissemination of false information, essentially granting additional powers to authorities to censor independent journalists and stifle critics.^{24 25} Türkiye's withdrawal in 2021 from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, known as the Istanbul Convention, worsened already high femicide rates and women's rights overall. In 2021, 280 women were killed by men, and 217 women were found dead under suspicious circumstances.²⁶ Comparatively, femicide rates increased significantly in 2022, with 334 women killed by men and 245 found dead under suspicious circumstances.²⁷ According to the We Will Stop Femicides Platform's data, "the only year in which femicides decreased was 2011, the year the Istanbul Convention was signed."²⁸ Despite the clear evidence that if implemented properly, the Istanbul Convention saves lives, there has been limited to no progress in overturning the withdrawal from the Convention in 2022. Women's groups and opposition political parties have been voicing their concerns about the withdrawal ever since it came into effect, and in July, they brought the issue to the supreme court of appeals. However, the latter ruled that the withdrawal by presidential decree had not been unlawful.²⁹

In this context, the general elections of 2023 were intensely polarized, eventually leading to violent clashes, including reports of AKP supporters attacking an opposition rally in Erzurum.³⁰ The election days themselves were characterized by manipulation, violence, and allegations of fraud, with several reported incidents of voting station officials being attacked by pro-government groups across the country.³¹ The election was close; Erdoğan won the runoff with 52.18% of the vote and

AKP lost seats in parliament.³² However, the composition of the new majority is now more reactionary than before, with Erdoğan's AKP leading an ultranationalist coalition.³³ Notably, the fundamentalist Islamist Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR), known for its ties with Kurdish Islamist Hezbollah and its ultra-conservative views on women's rights, won four parliamentary seats.³⁴

The elections gave many hope that Türkiye could change its course of decline. However, now it is going to take more work than ever to achieve the vibrant, inclusive, thriving society that so many people want, in a country that is vital to the stability of Europe, the Middle East, and beyond.



Peru – Decades of Progress in Jeopardy



Melinda Ellington

Peru steadily improved on the Fragile States Index from 2006, with a sharp reduction in poverty,¹ and improvements in literacy,² infant mortality,³ and life expectancy.⁴ But against a backdrop of high inequality, since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 the country has veered sharply toward greater fragility, and in 2022 was among the most worsened overall. In a political system fraught with division pitting the interests of indigenous, rural, and working-class people against the urban, elite minority,⁵ a sharp increase in inflation and riots over fuel prices worsened an already volatile situation. In December, left-leaning President Pedro Castillo unsuccessfully attempted to dissolve Congress to forestall impeachment for alleged corruption.⁶ The move backfired. He was impeached and detained, leading to widespread protests, a state of emergency, and clashes that resulted in dozens of deaths.

Peru exhibited significant improvement in the economy since the 1990s with the second-highest economic growth in South America through 2015 and a reduction of nationwide poverty by almost 40 percentage points during that time.^{7,8} However, inequality has remained high with a Gini Index score of 40.2 in 2021.⁹ Food insecurity has been increasing, with over half the population considered moderately or severely food insecure in 2020.¹⁰ And during the COVID recession the poverty rate spiked to rates not seen in a decade.¹¹ Peru had the highest per-capita death rate from COVID-19 in the world in 2022,¹² with the brunt of this health crisis falling on the poorest and most disenfranchised communities. The war in Ukraine exacerbated

these pressures, with soaring prices for fertilizer, food, and fuel.¹³ As a result, Peru had its highest inflation rate in 24 years at 8.45% which had a regressive impact on the most impoverished members of Peruvian society, further exacerbating regional and class tensions.¹⁴ In an attempt to mitigate these pressures, the government suspended the gas tax.¹⁵

President Castillo was a political outsider from rural Peru, who was elected in a runoff election in June 2021 despite having garnered a mere 19% plurality during the first round of voting.¹⁶ While many hoped he would be able to usher in change as one of the first political leaders with no ties to establishment politics, the absence of a mandate or allies within Congress led to an embittered struggle that stalled policy progress on all fronts.¹⁷ Within months of his assuming office, there began multiple attempts to impeach him on a range of charges from “moral incapacity” to corruption. Congress further attempted to constrain Castillo’s ability to effect policy through the removal of cabinet members. Finally, in December 2022, President Castillo declared the dissolution of Congress and the installation of a new government to rule by decree.¹⁸ But without the backing of the military or state police, the plan failed, and he was quickly removed and replaced by his Vice President Dina Boluarte in less than 24 hours.¹⁹ This turn of events led to weeks of protests by supporters of Castillo that frequently turned violent, with both protestors and journalists being attacked by police and security forces.²⁰ Newly instated President Boluarte declared a 30-day state of emergency, suspending the right to assembly, in an effort to quell ongoing

violence and rising protests in rural and Indigenous communities around the country.²¹


These events were met with mixed reactions from state leaders in the region, with left-leaning governments such as Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, and Colombia supporting ousted President Castillo, while the United Nations, United States, Canada, and the European Union largely supporting Peru's right-wing Congress and President Boluarte.²²

So far in 2023, the country has experienced ongoing protests and violence, with road blockages further exacerbating food shortages.²³ Protestors are demanding the closure of Congress, constitutional reform, and new elections.²⁴ Allegations of targeted repression of Indigenous groups, rural workers, and journalists have prompted calls for accountability of Congress and a swift, bloodless resolution to the turmoil that threatens to further increase fragility.²⁵

Findings from FFP's [Crisis Sensitivity Simulator](#) suggest that for a country like Peru, even where the long-term trends in the Fragile States Index are positive overall, there are particular combinations of shocks (e.g., a health crisis affecting public services in the context of political controversy) that can be uniquely destabilizing, in comparison to other types and combinations of challenges. If Peru is to become more resilient, it will need to do more than to resolve the immediate problem. Peru must address the issues of inequality and social cohesion that have persisted for decades. Otherwise, the next time there is a similar shock, it will cycle back into chaos.



Planning for the Unpredictable



Daniel Woodburn

As Yogi Berra wisely said, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”¹ Through an international relations lens, it certainly is tough because 1) we do not know when a crisis might strike, and 2) it is surprisingly difficult to know how a country will perform when confronted by a shock. In light of this, the Fragile States Index is useful for the observation of historical trends, not so much for forecasting. For one thing, an external (or even an internal) shock can overwhelm a country long considered stable. A single devastating weather event can ruin a country’s tourism industry, for example. Or consider France, which is one of the least fragile countries in the world, and which has improved more or less steadily over the past 18 years, yet still appears perpetually perched on the precipice of pseudo-revolution.² Although warnings of global pandemics have been sounded for decades, no one could know for sure when or where the next one will strike. When it did eventually strike, COVID-19 cascaded across the globe in unexpected ways.

In the absence of a crystal ball, it would seem that everyone everywhere needs to prepare for everything all the time. But it is human nature to either fight the last war or hope for the

best rather than plan for the next bad thing that could happen – which leaves countries exposed when it does.³ And many countries simply lack the capacity, for example, to plan human settlements around weather events, such as the cyclone that displaced 125,000 Mozambicans in 2019.⁴

Ukraine stands out as a particularly salient example of the complexities of planning for an uncertain future despite a wealth of historical data. In February 2022, Russia made the mistake of assessing Ukraine as a relatively fragile state whose government could be easily toppled.⁵ Sixteen months later Russia is embroiled in a protracted war, having had to implement mass conscription.⁶ For its part, Ukraine has shown itself to be resilient not just on the battlefield, but across its society, demonstrating an adaptability that mirrors the fervent national pride that has underpinned its resistance.⁷ Even armed with knowledge of Russia’s imminent invasion, no analyst could have foreseen the twists and turns that the war has taken, and therefore how Ukraine’s levels of fragility would be impacted. And even now that the war is in full swing, it is difficult to predict what will happen next. Even if Ukraine eventually repulses the invasion, its FSI score will not immediately rebound to pre-war levels, considering the damage that has been wrought on its economy, infrastructure and society, with

the deaths of tens of thousands of conscripted servicemen, not to mention civilian casualties. Many of those who have taken refuge abroad may not return. Yet so far, Ukraine's resilience has been rigorously tested, and held firm.⁸ One way or another, eventually the violence will end and herald the gradual return of the mundanities of peace-time governance, such as concerns about levels of unemployment, education provision, or basic public services in general, not to mention rebuilding much of the country's damaged or destroyed infrastructure.

Another country that illustrates the challenges of prediction using the FSI, is the Philippines. As often happens in the wake of an election, the country's political landscape was substantially altered in 2022, when Bongbong Marcos was elected.⁹ This has resulted in the Philippines being among the best performers in the 2023 FSI with a 2.7-point improvement from the year before, to reach its best score since the very first edition of the FSI in 2006.

This improvement comes after a period of elevated fragility during the pandemic when it was among the most worsened, with a 5-place drop in the 2021 FSI ranking due in part to a heavy-handed response to the pandemic.¹⁰ In the absence of mass testing and the slow upstart of a vaccination program, the Philippines relied on a heavily securitized approach to keeping the virus at bay, imposing strict quarantines, curtailing civil rights, and compounding poverty further.¹¹ With echoes of China's strict approach to handling the virus (before letting it spread in 2022¹²), unlike the Chinese Communist Party, Filipino authorities' provision of basic services, such as the distribution of food, left a lot to be desired.¹³ Civil society's attempts to step in and fill the gaps were even politicized by the government, with do-gooders accused of links to 'communist' groups.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the military's involvement in enforcing the government's draconian approach to public health led to a spike in human rights abuses.¹⁵ In a country where the government actively adopted a "shoot first, don't ask any

questions later" policy to its drug problem, thousands of alleged drug-dealers were summarily executed by security forces between 2016 and 2022, over the course of President Duterte's tenure.¹⁶ Paradoxically, where this led to a deterioration of 1.9 points in the Philippines' Human Rights score between the 2016 and 2023 editions of the FSI, the popularity of Duterte's approach to the war on drugs with the general Filipino population merely translated to minor fluctuations in the State Legitimacy score during the same period, sometimes for the better (hovering around a high baseline in the 7s where it had been previous to Duterte's election).¹⁷ Although it is worth noting other factors were at play in that score's calculation, few other democracies could actively and openly encourage extrajudicial execution of their citizens without seeing a spike in the State Legitimacy score.

On the international front, President Duterte's election in 2016 apparently hailed a shift away from the Philippine's long-term trading partner, the United States, and towards China and Russia, before a mid-term climb-down when relations with China were strained by the dynamics of the uneven partnership.¹⁸ In 2021, with his aspirations for an equitable Chinese-Filipino pact in tatters, Duterte's government worked to mend bridges with Washington and reinstate security ties with the USA.¹⁹ The Chinese realignment was short-lived, and the Philippines completed its about-face with the election of Bongbong Marcos in 2022, who quickly signalled his intention to strengthen the US-Philippines partnership his father – former president Ferdinand Marcos – had upheld during the Cold War.²⁰ This geopolitical whiplash is emblematic of Filipino politics: presidents are limited to a single 6-year term under the constitution, meaning they have comparatively little time to implement their vision, which often leads to short-sighted and impulsive policymaking. The short-termism that arguably keeps other democratically elected heads of state and government accountable seemingly has had the opposite effect in the Philippines, where the president commands significant power

and where checks-and-balances aren't quite so influential.²¹ This leads to political 180° turns, and a lack of consistency, not only from one six-year tenure to the next, but within presidential terms themselves.

The Philippines illustrates the challenges of using the FSI as a predictive tool. The Philippines was the second most improved in the 2023 FSI, placing it alongside the likes of other countries with big improvements like Guyana. However, it has a history of volatility in the FSI, which in itself signals a kind of fragility – a country buffeted by external shocks like the pandemic, and susceptible to the whims of individual leaders, as evidenced by the ease with which Duterte strengthened security forces' ability to violate human rights in the name of the war on drugs. While some may see the Philippines as an indictment of democracy and the short-termism it breeds, it is rather a cautionary tale of the dangers of the cult of personality and weak checks-and-balances. Either way, it illustrates the ebbs and flows of fragility and therefore the limitations of using the FSI to predict the political future.

That would seem to leave us where we started: in the intolerable position of everyone everywhere needing to prepare for everything all the time. Or simply throwing up our hands in the absence of capacity and resources. Or just focusing on fighting the last war. To fill this gap, the Fund for Peace partnered with SAS to build the [Crisis Sensitivity Simulator](#) (CSS), which takes the 18-year history of each country and juxtaposes that data with the new [State Resilience Index](#) to help countries prioritize.²² In the case of the Philippines, the CSS suggests that it is most sensitive to shocks affecting Demographic Pressures (such as a pandemic), Human Rights, and Security Apparatus. The new administration would do well to focus their efforts on shoring up capacity to manage those risks.



State Fragility and the Shadow of Genocide in Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia (the South Caucasus)



Alexis Poston

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In the early hours of 13 September 2022, Azeri Armed Forces launched a shelling attack against Armenian cities and towns along the Armenian-Azerbaijani borders, largely impacting the towns of Vardenis, Jermuk, Sisian, Goris, and Kapan.¹ Reports following the attacks revealed that Azeri forces were not just targeting Armenian military positions, as was claimed by Azerbaijan’s government,² but they were also targeting civilian areas.³ These attacks on Armenia by Azerbaijan were the latest in a series of attacks spanning decades. From their time as part of the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and to gaining their independence as their own states, tensions have run high and consistently contribute to the increasing fragility of both states. The most recent attacks are, in part, responsible for Armenia’s rise from 97th to 93rd most fragile state this year, and even more significantly, the rise from 108th most fragile in 2019.

In the 1990s, both Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence from the Soviet Union and Nagorno Karabakh also declared independence, despite remaining an officially

recognized territory of Azerbaijan. These events became known as the First Nagorno Karabakh War, which ended in 1994 with Nagorno Karabakh and neighboring districts coming under Armenian control. From 1994 until 2020, tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan remained high with intermittent incidents highlighting the possibility of another war breaking out between the two states. In September 2020, war broke out again with Azerbaijan attacking along the Nagorno Karabakh territorial line with Azerbaijan.⁴ This six-week war ended with a trilateral ceasefire between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The 2020 ceasefire agreement saw the return of Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan and the establishment of Russian peacekeeping forces along the Lachin Corridor between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia.⁵

Nagorno Karabakh has historically been a predominantly Armenian region, both ethnically and culturally, and is still largely Armenian.⁶ While ethnic Azerbaijanis and other groups have also resided in the region, Armenians are largely considered to be indigenous to Nagorno Karabakh.⁷ For decades, the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh have been peacefully demonstrating and calling for their right to self-autonomy to be respected by Azerbaijan’s government.

The peace deal that followed the Second Nagorno Karabakh War saw Armenia ceding the territories of Nagorno Karabakh, which was met with anger from Armenians in both Armenia and within Nagorno Karabakh.⁸ These protests called for

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign as Prime Minister. Despite these protests and the diminishment of public confidence in his leadership, which has contributed to an elevated score in Armenia's State Legitimacy indicator (6.3 out of 10), he did not resign.⁹ He in fact won a snap election following the war,¹⁰ in part due to the support of Russia's President Putin.¹¹

Since the end of the Second Nagorno Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has regularly violated the ceasefire agreement, provoking firefights with Armenia along the border. As the ethnic violence continues, this distrust in Prime Minister Pashinyan does not bode well for the stability of Armenia. A blockade of the Lachin Corridor has cut Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh off from accessing medical care and their schools. Food supplies are running low. Power and gas in homes are being cut off by Azerbaijan's government, which is impacting the living conditions. Armenian civilians of Nagorno Karabakh and surrounding regions along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border are threatened by Azerbaijan's military and face violence if they try to leave Armenian territory within disputed areas, which former Human Rights Defender of Armenia Arman Tatoyan has described as a "deliberate policy of isolation."¹²

Azerbaijan's President, Ilhan Aliyev, and other Azerbaijani political leaders have been accused of using dog whistles and genocidal rhetoric when referring to Armenia and Armenians,¹³ which is unsettling for the ethnically Armenian residents in Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan's government spreads Azerbaijani nationalist messages with anti-Armenian themes through state media.¹⁴ Anti-Armenian sentiment has been prevalent in Azerbaijan's "victory memorials," following the Second Nagorno Karabakh War. Messages often depict Azerbaijan as the victims of radical Armenian nationalism, which can further exacerbate longstanding ethnic tensions and justify violence. Over time, this nationalism has resulted in the

destruction of Armenian cultural and religious sites and the oppression of Armenian language and culture in Nagorno Karabakh and other regions within Azerbaijan.^{15 16}

The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention and the International Association of Genocide Scholars have both highlighted the genocide risk factors against Armenians in Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, and Armenia.^{17 18} Additionally, the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, in their fourth Red Flag for Genocide update on Azerbaijan, pinpoint the incrementalization of genocidal processes and how Azerbaijan's actions towards Armenians and Armenia fit within this understanding of genocide.¹⁹

In peace talks that have followed the ongoing violence in Nagorno Karabakh, several Western states have proposed and supported policies that largely favor Armenia giving up Nagorno Karabakh entirely to Azerbaijan in the name of peace and regional stability.²⁰ Geopolitical dynamics put Armenia at a disadvantage at the negotiation table, as powerful interests in the region are hesitant to openly oppose Turkey, who is an ally of Azerbaijan and has a long history of conflict with Armenia.²¹ With a lack of direct action following the few resolutions passed by international organizations, such as the European Parliament and the International Court of Justice,²² little is being done by other states to support Armenia.

There are numerous factors contributing to both Armenia and Azerbaijan's instability, not least the threat of continued violence that jeopardizes ethnic Armenians within Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan. As peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan continue, the international community has the opportunity to support genocide prevention in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Peacebuilding and accountability are crucial components of addressing state fragility in the South Caucasus region.



Fragility Revisited

Pauline H. Baker, President Emeritus, FFP

An editorial cartoon in the May 27, 2023, edition of *The Economist* depicted a race about to start with four entrants, each represented by a pretzel-like twisted figure in a state of panic. Onlookers explained it was “a race to determine who’s the most dysfunctional...and all of the countries are losing.” The contestants were Italian politics, Israeli politics, UK politics and US politics. The cartoon was a brilliant portrayal of what has changed in the international arena since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several commentators have tried to interpret the transformation in catchy slogans, such as “The End of History,” “The Clash of Civilizations,” “The West vs the Rest” or “The New Cold War.” What has really changed, however, is more fundamental: significant dysfunctionality exists not just in poorer and weaker countries, but in richer and more powerful ones as well.

This raises the question of whether state fragility is still perceived as a security threat by the public and decision-makers, as it was when the FSI was first published in 2006. The fear at that time was that state fragility, or actual state failure, in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, would lead to greater jihadist terrorism and violent extremism. Today, the rise of Great Power competition--and the concomitant rise of regional powers—appears to be supplanting these concerns. Yet state fragility is not only still important; in many ways it is of greater consequence than before. In a sense, fragility has been turned on its head: stronger powers are revealing interior weaknesses and poorer countries fear they could become collateral damage or intended targets of aggressive and expansionist goals from political decay, dictatorship, and discord in larger world powers.

Fragility is still a vital concern, then, not only because of ideological rivalry *between* the Great Powers but primarily because of the nature, complexity, speed, and scope of transformations occurring *within* them. Over the last two decades, hyper-politicized internal politics characterized by growing Group Grievance and Factionalized Elites, two key fragility indicators, along with other indicators of economic, social, and demographic disruptions, are causing paralysis and dysfunction. This trend is undermining geopolitical norms, heightening the risk of violence, fostering misunderstanding, and increasing unpredictability.

Few countries, for example, believed that Russia would invade Ukraine. When it happened, and Ukrainian resistance was surprisingly strong, it was widely presumed that the outcome of the war would depend on how much the US and its allies strengthened the military capabilities of the Kyiv government. Military imbalance continues to be a central concern, but it is not the only factor shaping the terms of combat on the battlefield. The fierce solidarity and bravery of the Ukrainians, the incompetence of the Russian military once thought to be the second most powerful force in the world, and the susceptibility of the Putin regime to domestic challenges and international opprobrium have forced a recalculation from all quarters. Unanticipated developments such as these are challenging old norms, overturning outdated premises, turning former pawns on the geopolitical chessboard into active players, and reframing assessments of powers previously considered stable.

Because of its adaptive methodology, the FSI is accommodating these shifting dynamics, continuing to provide insights into the risk of future conflicts. There are a greater number of evidence-based measures and a broader range of data to be woven into

the 12 solid indicators that have stood the test of time over the last 18 years. Conducted annually, the FSI continues to monitor the quickened pace of change in each indicator, country by country, region by region, tracking the shape and strength of new alliances. The lens of fragility provides an analytical map across the spectrum of conflicts. More research needs to be conducted by analysts on the companion, and equally important, challenge, of building resilience, examining institutional, economic, security, demographic, environmental, and cultural factors. Sustainable resilience is not merely a matter of reversing the intensity and duration of fragility indicators; it additionally requires developing institutional, social, and civic capabilities that take years to achieve.

Peering slightly into the future, two big questions stand out.

What Can Fragile States Gain from Great Power Rivalry?

Conventional thinking has held that fragile states will be worse off from Great Power rivalry, but what is happening is more complex. States which might be at risk of becoming client states or battlefields for proxy wars, as happened during the Cold War, are seeking opportunities for extracting better terms of engagement with their allies, including security arrangements, trade preferences, debt relief, infrastructure projects, and regime support. As Fareed Zakaria noted, “countries that were once populous but poor have moved from the margins to center stage.”¹

The Non-Aligned Movement might be better labelled the Re-Aligned movement since members are making decisions based on their own national interests, as they define them. South Africa, for example, withheld its support of the US position in the United Nations which condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and has generated closer military and economic ties with Russia and China. Pretoria also considered violating its treaty with the International Criminal Court, which has

indicted Vladimir Putin for kidnaping Ukrainian children, by searching for ways to avoid arresting him if he enters the country. Intensification of competition for support from poorer countries could reshape the purpose and mission of foreign aid, impact international trade, and redesign the architecture of international organizations.

What will the Great Powers Focus Upon to Gain an Edge Over Their Competitors: Exploiting the Fragility of Their Adversaries, Reducing Their Internal Vulnerabilities, or Building Resilience?

Most strategic planners would say “all of the above.” But that could create an imbalance of power and dangerously risk war if rivals go full throttle in opposite directions. We may see clusters of democracies versus clusters of authoritarian states, each group collectively fragile or bogged down in internal disputes as in NATO (with Turkey and Hungary), Europe (still struggling with the aftermath of Brexit), and Africa (with food insecurity, worsening crime, and expanding jihadist militancy in the Sahel, the Horn, and southern Africa).

The option selected by the US thus far indicates that Washington is gearing up for reinvigorated diplomacy—a form of building resilience. As articulated by President Joe Biden in his address at the Air Force Academy in May 2023, it is promoting partnerships with like-minded nations, a strategy that has been the traditional key to asserting American power abroad against adversaries. Biden justifiably boasted of “our unmatched network of alliances and partners,” which extends from an enlarging NATO, the most powerful military pact in the world, to forming alliances with previously marginalized states, such as Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and other Pacific Island states. For financial aid and other benefits these countries are giving the US control of their defense, allowing the US to create a security ring, along with old allies such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines,

against China if it invades Taiwan. China started on its own quest to expand its influence by expanding military relationships and launching their Belt and Road Initiative, an infrastructure construction project. Similarly, regional actors, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Brazil, Israel, Qatar, and others, are clamoring for influence.

What Impact Has Great Power Rivalry Had on Future World Order?

Interlocking webs of entangling relationships are redrawing the geopolitical map. This does not make fragility any less of a threat. It simply makes it more complicated, more unpredictable, and more rapidly changing. A new consciousness of fragility as a wider, and more urgent threat is emerging. Leaders at all levels of power and influence who ignore this factor in their strategic calculations will be doing so at their own peril.



ENDNOTES

Twisting and Turning: Why Fragility Still Matters in a Time of Great Power Competition

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THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

In a highly interconnected world, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises emerge from ethnic tensions; some are civil wars; others take on the form of revolutions; and many result in complex humanitarian emergencies.

Fault lines can emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state fragility are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that contribute to fragility — and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. A mixed approach integrating qualitative and quantitative data sources is needed to establish patterns and trends. With the right data and analysis it is possible to identify problems that may be simmering below the surface. Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP) is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states' capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index — and the social science framework and data

analysis tools upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, FFP collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries that we analyze.

ORIGINS OF THE FSI: THE CAST FRAMEWORK

The genesis of most indices is to begin with a concept of what needs to be measured, followed by the development of a methodology that hopes to perform that measurement. The FSI followed a very different trajectory, whereby the idea for the Index occurred subsequently to the development of its own methodology.

The FSI traces its origins to the creation of FFP's Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which was developed in the 1990s as a framework for policymakers and field practitioners to be able to better understand and measure conflict drivers and dynamics in complex environments. The CAST framework has been widely peer reviewed, and the continued usage of the framework by many of those same professionals, as well as now by local civil society and community groups in conflict-affected areas, is testament to the framework's enduring relevance. In 2004, the CAST framework was used as the basis for the FSI, as researchers wished to determine whether state fragility could be assessed and ranked at a national level using the existing framework.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE FSI ANALYTICAL PROCESS

Though at the ground level the CAST framework is applied using various practices such as individual incident reporting and observation by field monitors, the sheer volume of data to be analyzed at an international level required a different approach. To that end, technology was employed to enable researchers to process large volumes of data to perform the national level assessments that feed into the FSI.

Based on CAST’s comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

1. **Content Analysis:** Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.
2. **Quantitative Data:** Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for each country are then compared with the provisional scores from the Content Analysis phase. Depending on the degree to which the Content Analysis


and the Quantitative Data agree, the provisional scores are confirmed, or where they disagree, are reconciled based on a set of rules that dictate allowable movements in score in the event of disagreement between the two data streams.

3. **Qualitative Review:** Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up – which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.

These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source are checked by the others. Though the basic data underpinning of the Index is already freely and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources. Final indicator scores for each country are then produced from this process. A panel review is then conducted

by the research team of the final Index to ensure all scores are proportionate across the country spectrum.

The final FSI Index product is intended as an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis for the user. Though an index inherently ranks different countries – making some more fragile than others – ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policy makers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state’s resiliency. To that end, the following section outlines what each indicator seeks to measure in the Index – as well as providing guiding questions for deeper levels of analysis and inquiry by the user.





UNDERSTANDING THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 179 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data — quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation — are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of expert social science research.

INTERPRETING THE FSI SCORES

The 2023 FSI, the 18th edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2022 and December 31, 2022 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2023 are not covered by the 2023 Index. The FSI scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement and greater relative stability, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. FFP attempts as much as possible to de-emphasize rankings, as it is our firm belief that a country's overall score (and indeed, its indicator scores) are a far more important and accurate barometer of a country's performance, and that as much as countries should be compared against other countries, it is more useful to compare a country against itself, over time. Hence, our analysis focuses more on specific indicator scores or trend lines over time rather than just rankings. Ultimately, the FSI is an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis by civil society, government, businesses and practitioners alike — to understand more about a state's capacities and pressures which contribute to levels of fragility and resilience.

COHESION INDICATORS



Security Apparatus



Factionalized Elites



Group Grievance

ECONOMIC INDICATORS



Economic Decline



Uneven Development



Human Flight & Brain Drain

POLITICAL INDICATORS



State Legitimacy



Public Services



Human Rights & Rule of Law

SOCIAL + CROSS-CUTTING INDICATORS



Demographic Pressures



Refugees & IDPs



External Intervention

THE INDICATORS: COHESION

SECURITY APPARATUS



The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The Security Apparatus indicator also takes into account serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. In other instances, the security apparatus of a state can include a “deep state”, that may consist of secret intelligence units, or other irregular security forces, that serve the interests of a political leader or clique. As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Questions to consider may include:*

Monopoly on the Use of Force

- Is the military under civilian control?
- Do private militias exist against the state?
- Is there paramilitary activity?
- Do private armies exist to protect assets?
- Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?

Relationship Between Security and Citizenry

- Are the police considered to be professional?
- Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?
- Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?

Force

- Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?
- Are there accusations of police brutality?

Arms

- Is there a high availability of weapons?
- If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?

FACTIONALIZED ELITES



The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinkmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It also factors in the use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). In extreme cases, it can be representative of the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry. The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions and, where elections occur, will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class).

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

GROUP GRIEVANCE

Questions to consider may include*:

Representative Leadership

- Is leadership fairly elected? Is leadership representative of the population?
- Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?
- Is there a political reconciliation process?
- Is the military representative of the population?

Identity

- Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
- Does hate speech via radio and media exist?
- Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?
- Does cross-cultural respect exist?

Resource Distribution

- Is wealth concentrated in hands of a few?
- Is there a burgeoning middle class?
- Does any one group control the majority of resources?
- Are resources fairly distributed? Does the government adequately distribute wealth through taxes?

Equality and Equity

- Are the laws democratic or reasonable?
- Is the system representative of the population?



The Group Grievance indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries, that influence and shape that group’s role in society and relationships with other groups. This history may in turn be shaped by patterns of real or perceived atrocities or “crimes” committed with apparent impunity against communal groups. Groups may also feel aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence to which they believe they are entitled. The indicator also considers where specific groups are singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression, or where there is public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power “illegitimately,” which may manifest itself in the emergence of fiery rhetoric, such as through “hate” radio, pamphleteering, and stereotypical or nationalistic political speech.

Questions to consider may include*:

Post-Conflict Response

- Does a Truth & Reconciliation process exist or is one needed?
- Have groups been reintegrated?
- Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
- Are victims of past atrocities compensated (or is there a plan to)?
- Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted?
- Has amnesty been granted?

Equality

- Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?

Divisions

- Are there feelings/reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance and/or violence?
- Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
- Is there history of violence against a group or group grievance?
- How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
- Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society? Are there reports of religiously motivated violence?

Communal Violence

- Is vigilante justice reported?
- Are there reports of mass violence and/or killings?

THE INDICATORS: ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC DECLINE



Economic Decline indicator considers factors related to economic decline within a country. For example, the indicator looks at patterns of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, Gross National Product, unemployment rates, inflation, productivity, debt, poverty levels, or business failures. It also takes into account sudden drops in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment, and any collapse or devaluation of the national currency. The Economic Decline indicator further considers the responses to economic conditions and their consequences, such as extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs, or perceived increasing group inequalities. The Economic Decline indicator is focused on the formal economy as well as illicit trade, including the drug and human trafficking, and capital flight, or levels of corruption and illicit transactions such as money laundering or embezzlement.

Questions to consider may include:*

Public Finances

- What level is the government debt?

Economic Conditions

- How are the interest rates – actual and projected?
- How is the inflation rate – actual and projected?
- What is the level of productivity?
- What is the GDP – actual and projected?
- How is the unemployment – current and rate of unemployment?

Economic Climate

- Consumer Confidence: How do people view the economy?
- How do experts view the economy?
- Is the business climate attractive to Foreign Direct Investment?
- Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?

Economic Diversification

- Economic Focus: Does one product make up the majority of the economy?

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT



The Uneven Economic Development indicator considers inequality within the economy, irrespective of the actual performance of an economy. For example, the Indicator looks at structural inequality that is based on group (such as racial, ethnic, religious, or other identity group) or based on education, economic status, or region (such as urban-rural divide). The Indicator considers not only actual inequality, but also perceptions of inequality, recognizing that perceptions of economic inequality can fuel grievance as much as real inequality, and can reinforce communal tensions or nationalistic rhetoric. Further to measuring economic inequality, the Indicator also takes into account the opportunities for groups to improve their economic status, such as through access to employment, education, or job training such that, even if there is economic inequality present, to what degree it is structural and reinforcing?

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

HUMAN FLIGHT AND BRAIN DRAIN

Questions to consider may include*:

Economic Equality

- Economic Equality: Is there a large economic gap?
- Is the economic system discriminatory?
- Does economic justice exist?
- Are hiring practices generally fair – legally and perceived?
- Do equal rights exist in the society?
- Are there laws protecting equal rights?

Economic Opportunity

- Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
- Is the education provided relatively equal?
- Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?
- Do programs for job training exist?
- Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?

Socio-Economic Dynamics

- Do ghettos and slums exist?



The Human Flight and Brain Drain Indicator considers the economic impact of human displacement (for economic or political reasons) and the consequences this may have on a country's development. On the one hand, this may involve the voluntary emigration of the middle class – particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, or skilled workers such as physicians – due to economic deterioration in their home country and the hope of better opportunities farther afield. On the other hand, it may involve the forced displacement of professionals or intellectuals who are fleeing their country due to actual or feared persecution or repression. The indicator specifically measures the economic impact that displacement may wreak on an economy through the loss of productive, skilled professional labor.

Questions to consider may include*:

Retention of Technical and Intellectual Capital

- Are professionals leaving the country?
- Are politicians or political elites leaving the country?
- Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?
- Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?

Economics

- Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?

Diaspora

- Is there growth of a country's exiled communities or diasporas abroad?
- Does the diaspora have an impact on the home state economy, or on politics in the home state?

THE INDICATORS: POLITICAL

STATE LEGITIMACY



The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The Indicator looks at the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions and, where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the government is representative of the population which it governs. The Indicator takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or otherwise excluding opposition groups. The Indicator also considers the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population's confidence in its government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.

Questions to consider may include*:

Confidence in the Political Process

- Does the government have the confidence of the people?

Political Opposition

- Have demonstrations occurred?
- Have riots or uprisings occurred?

Transparency

- Is there evidence of corruption on the part of government officials?
- Are national and/or local officials considered to be corrupt?

Openness and Fairness of the Political Process

- Do all parties enjoy political rights?
- Is the government representative of the population?
- Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?
- What is the longer term history of power transitions?
- Are elections perceived free and fair?
- Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?

Political Violence

- Are there reports of politically motivated attacks, assassinations?
- Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?
- Have there been terrorist attacks and how likely are they?

PUBLIC SERVICES



The Public Services Indicator refers to the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. On the one hand, this may include the provision of essential services, such as health, education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, and internet and connectivity. On the other hand, it may include the state's ability to protect its citizens, such as from terrorism and violence, through perceived effective policing. Further, even where basic state functions and services are provided, the Indicator further considers to whom – whether the state narrowly serves the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, or the diplomatic service, while failing to provide comparable levels of service to the general populace – such as rural versus urban populations. The Indicator also considers the level and maintenance of general infrastructure to the extent that its absence would negatively affect the country's actual or potential development.

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

Questions to consider may include*:

General Provision of Public Services

- Is there equal access to public services?
- What are the general conditions of public services?

Health

- Is there adequate access to medicines?
- Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for all people?
- Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?
- Is sanitation system adequate?

Education

- What is the level of school enrollment? Is it different by gender?
- What are the literacy rates? Is it different by gender?

Shelter

- Do the poor have access to housing?
- Are housing costs in line with economy?

Infrastructure

- Are roads adequate and safe?
- Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?
- Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?
- Is there an adequate supply of fuel?



The Human Rights and Rule of Law Indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected. The Indicator looks at whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political

ends, repression of political opponents). The Indicator also considers outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence perpetrated against civilians. It also looks at factors such as denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents, and whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.

Questions to consider may include*:

Civil and Political Rights and Freedoms

- Do communal, labor, political, and/or minority rights exist and are they protected?
- Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?
- Is the right to life protected for all?
- Is freedom of speech protected?
- Is there freedom of movement?
- Does religious freedom exist?

Violation of Rights

- Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or others?
- Are there reports of state- or group-sponsored torture?
- Are there labor laws or reports of forced labor or child labor?
- Are groups forced to relocate? Is there proper compensation?

Openness

- Does independent media exist?
- Do reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?
- Is there equal access to information?

Justice

- If rights aren't protected, is there a legal system in which they can be addressed?
- Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?
- Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?
- Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention?
- How are the prison conditions?

Equality

- Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?

THE INDICATORS: SOCIAL AND CROSS-CUTTING

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES



The Demographic Pressures Indicator considers pressures upon the state deriving from the population itself or the environment around it. For example, the Indicator measures population pressures related to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources, or health, such as prevalence of disease and epidemics. The Indicator considers demographic characteristics, such as pressures from high population growth

rates or skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge,” or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups, recognizing that such effects can have profound social, economic, and political effects. Beyond the population, the Indicator also takes into account pressures stemming from natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods or drought), and pressures upon the population from environmental hazards.

Questions to consider may include*:

Population

- Is the population growth rate sustainable? Is the current and projected distribution reasonable?
- Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there a high orphan population?

Public Health

- Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases, pandemics?
- Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases or epidemics?

Food and Nutrition

- Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption?
- Is there a likelihood of droughts?

- Is there a short-term food shortage or longer-term starvation?
- Are there long-term food shortages affecting health?

Environment

- Do sound environmental policies exist and are current practices sustainable?
- Is natural disaster likely, recurring?
- If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan?
- Has deforestation taken place or are there laws to protect forests?

Resources

- Does resource competition exist?
- Does land competition exist and are there laws to arbitrate disputes?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?

REFUGEES AND IDPS



The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Indicator measures the pressure upon states caused by the forced displacement of large communities as a result of social, political, environmental or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee flows into others. The indicator measures refugees by country of asylum, recognizing that population inflows can put additional pressure on public services, and can sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state if that state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources. The Indicator also measures the internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees by country of origin, which signifies internal state pressures as a result of violence, environmental or other factors such as health epidemics. These measures are considered within the context of the state’s population (per capita) and human development trajectory, and over time (year on year spikes), recognizing that some IDPs or refugees, may have been displaced for long periods of time.

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Questions to consider may include*:

Refugees

- Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
- Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?
- Are there reports of violence against refugees?
- Are conditions safe in refugee camps?

Internally Displaced Persons

- How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
- Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?

Response to Displacement

- Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?
- Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?



The External Intervention Indicator considers the influence and impact of external actors in the functioning – particularly security and economic – of a state. On the one hand, External Intervention focuses on security aspects of engagement from external actors, both covert and overt, in the internal affairs of a state by governments, armies, intelligence services, identity groups, or other entities that may affect the balance of power (or resolution of a conflict) within a state. On the other hand, External Intervention also focuses on economic engagement by outside actors, including multilateral organizations, through large-scale loans, development projects, or foreign aid, such as ongoing budget support, control of finances, or management of the state's economic policy, creating economic dependency. External Intervention also takes into account humanitarian intervention, such as the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission.

Questions to consider may include*:

Political Intervention

- Is there external support for factions opposed to the government?

Force Intervention

- Are foreign troops present?
- Are military attacks from other countries occurring?
- Is there external military assistance?
- Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states?
- Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground?
- Is there external support for police training?
- Are covert operations taking place?

Economic Intervention

- Is the country receiving economic intervention or aid?
- Is the country dependent on economic aid?

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2023

													Total	<i>Change from Previous Year</i>
Afghanistan	9.7	8.7	8.3	9.6	8.2	8.5	9.4	10	8.7	9.2	8.6	7.7	106.6	0.7
Albania	4.8	6.2	3.5	6.1	2.9	8.5	5	3.8	3.6	4.1	2.8	5.5	56.8	0.1
Algeria	5.8	6.9	7	6.2	5.2	5.1	7.6	5	6.9	5	6.2	3.1	70.0	-2.2
Angola	6.6	7.2	8.7	8.2	8.8	5.6	8.1	8.8	6.3	9.3	5.3	4	86.9	-1.2
Antigua and Barbuda	4.9	3.7	3.2	6.6	5.1	6.2	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	2.7	6.1	53.8	-0.4
Argentina	4.3	2.8	3.2	6.6	5.3	2.9	3.4	4.2	2.7	5.7	1.6	3.7	46.4	-1.5
Armenia	5.7	6.4	5.9	6.4	5.8	7.2	6.3	3.4	5.8	3.8	6.8	7	67.5	0.5
Australia	2.1	1.7	2.9	1.6	2.6	0.4	0.4	2.2	2.2	3.8	1.7	0.4	22.0	-0.7
Austria	1.4	3.2	3.3	1.2	2.5	1.7	0.6	1.7	0.4	3.6	4.5	0.3	24.4	-1
Azerbaijan	5.8	7.9	5.9	4.5	4.5	4.6	9.2	4.9	7.5	3.8	6.3	7.8	72.7	-0.4
Bahamas	4.3	4.5	2.3	4.5	4.7	4.4	1.8	5.3	4.5	6.3	2.5	4.1	49.2	-1.4
Bahrain	5.3	7.6	9.5	3.6	5.7	3	8	2.9	8.7	4.1	1.4	5.3	65.1	-1.5
Bangladesh	6.8	9.3	8.8	5.1	5.9	6.8	7.5	7.9	7.3	7.7	7.5	4.6	85.2	0.7
Barbados	4.4	4.2	2.3	6	5	5.1	1.2	3.5	2.6	3.7	1.9	5.5	45.4	-0.5
Belarus	5.4	9.6	5.3	5.3	3.3	4.6	9.4	2.7	8.3	4.8	3.2	8	69.9	1.2
Belgium	2.4	4.4	3.5	4.6	2.2	2.7	0.8	2.5	1	4.2	2.1	1	31.4	-0.5
Belize	6.8	4.3	4.7	6.9	3.6	5	3.4	5.4	5.6	5	3	6.1	59.8	-2.3
Benin	5.2	6.7	2.6	6.8	7.8	6.1	5.3	8.3	5.7	8	5.9	4.9	73.3	0.8
Bhutan	2.7	7.5	9.7	5.6	4.3	5.5	2.8	5.6	5	5.4	5.8	6.5	66.4	-1
Bolivia	5.3	8.2	6.4	5.7	7.6	5.6	6.4	6.3	5.7	6.9	2.6	4	70.7	-2.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.4	8.7	6.4	6.6	3.9	7.1	6.4	4.2	4.3	6.1	7.2	7	72.3	-0.7
Botswana	3.4	3.3	3.7	6.6	6.8	4.5	2.5	6.3	5	7.8	3.1	2.3	55.3	-0.8
Brazil	6.2	6.5	7.5	6.6	6.8	3.5	7.1	7.2	7.9	8.7	3.5	3	74.5	0.6
Brunei Darussalam	3.9	7.4	7.1	3	6.9	3.4	7.7	2	6.3	2.8	1.1	3.1	54.7	-0.4
Bulgaria	4.1	5.3	4	4.4	4.7	5.2	3.5	3.9	3.2	5.4	4.4	3.7	51.8	0.2
Burkina Faso	9.3	8.2	5.8	7.2	8.3	7	7.4	8.6	7	8.3	8.2	8.7	94.0	3.5
Burundi	7.8	8.5	6.7	8.8	7.2	5.2	9.1	8	8.6	8.7	8	7.6	94.2	-1.2
Cabo Verde	4.2	5.5	2.4	5.9	5	8	3.5	5.6	2.3	6.2	3.6	7.9	60.1	-1.3
Cambodia	6.4	8.7	5.5	5.2	6.4	6	9.1	7.4	8.3	6.4	3.9	7	80.3	-0.2
Cameroon	8.1	9.3	8.1	6	7.4	6.9	8.8	8.3	7.3	9	8.4	6.4	94	-2
Canada	2.2	2.5	2	1.4	2.5	0.7	0.4	1.7	1.9	1.2	2	0.4	18.9	-1.2
Central African Republic	8	9.4	8.1	8.2	9.6	6.2	8.9	10	9.1	9.3	9.5	9.4	105.7	-2.4
Chad	8.7	9.5	8.1	8.4	8.7	7.7	9.1	9.6	8.4	9.5	9	7.9	104.6	-1.1
Chile	3.6	2.2	3.8	4	4.9	3.3	4.4	3.9	3.6	5.9	1.5	1.1	42.2	-1
China	4.9	7.2	6.5	3.3	6.1	3.2	8.1	4.7	9.4	6.5	3.1	2.1	65.1	-1.8
Colombia	6.7	7.6	7.3	6.2	6.4	4.6	5.3	6	7.5	7.8	7.8	4.9	78.1	-0.3
Comoros	5.6	8	4.8	7.3	7.7	7.2	8	5.7	8.2	5.5	6.2	82.2	-0.1	
Congo Democratic Republic	8.8	9.6	9.4	8.1	8.4	6.4	9.3	9.3	9.3	9.7	9.8	9.1	107.2	-0.1
Congo Republic	6.4	6.7	8.8	9.3	7.5	6.2	9.1	8.7	7.2	8.5	6.5	5.8	90.7	-1.5
Costa Rica	2.9	3.8	2.4	5.5	5.1	2.9	1.2	4.1	1.2	2.9	4.9	3.5	40.4	-0.6
Côte d'Ivoire	6.6	9.9	6.7	6.2	7.5	5.8	7.5	8.2	6.9	8.6	6	7.2	87.1	-2.5
Croatia	2	4.4	4.3	5.7	2.9	6.1	2.3	2.9	2	4.8	6.8	4.5	48.7	-0.6
Cuba	3.4	7	2.2	5.6	3.8	5.6	7.6	4.5	6.3	5.9	3.2	4.4	59.5	-0.6
Cyprus	2.9	7.9	4.5	5.6	4.5	3.5	4.2	3.3	3	3.4	5.9	8.3	57	0.1
Czechia	2	5.3	4	4.4	1.9	3.5	3.9	2.9	1.9	3.2	4.5	2.7	40.2	0.3

													Total	<i>Change from Previous Year</i>
Denmark	1.1	1.4	3.1	1	1.8	1	0.3	1.7	0.6	2.3	3	0.6	17.9	-0.2
Djibouti	5.3	7.3	5.3	7	7.2	4	8.8	7.6	7.9	7.1	7.1	7.6	82.2	0.9
Dominican Republic	5.5	6.2	4.6	4.6	4.7	6.7	5.4	6.4	4.1	6.4	2.6	3.6	60.8	-2
Ecuador	6	8.2	5.9	6	6.2	4.2	6.4	6	4.3	6.7	5	4.5	69.4	0.3
Egypt	7	9.1	7.7	7.1	4.5	5	8.6	4.7	9.2	6.7	5.5	6.5	81.6	-2
El Salvador	6	4.8	5.3	5.5	5.1	8.7	5.2	6.2	5.4	6.8	5.3	5	69.3	-1.5
Equatorial Guinea	5.9	8.2	7.5	6.7	7.6	3.7	9.9	8.5	8.2	9.1	5.5	3.6	84.4	0.3
Eritrea	6	8.4	8.7	7.1	7.9	8.6	9.7	8.1	9.1	7.7	6.6	6.6	94.5	-1.4
Estonia	1.7	5.8	6.8	3.2	3	4.7	1	1.9	1.3	2.9	2.6	3.7	38.6	0.9
Eswatini	4.5	6.8	2	9.4	7.8	6	8.8	7.1	8.2	8.7	3.7	6.1	79.1	-1.3
Ethiopia	8.6	9.3	8.9	6.8	7.5	6.2	8.2	8.7	8.8	9.8	9.5	8.1	100.4	1.1
Fiji	6.4	8.2	5.4	7.5	5	7.6	6.1	4.2	5.4	4.6	3.2	6.6	70.2	1.3
Finland	2	1.4	0.3	2.7	1.6	1.5	0.4	1	0.5	1.7	1.9	1	16	0.9
France	2.9	1.9	6.4	3.4	2.9	2	1	1.2	1.1	3.1	2.4	0.5	28.8	-2.1
Gabon	4.2	7.7	3.1	5.9	5.8	4.6	8.1	6.8	6.1	6.7	2.6	3.9	65.5	-1.2
Gambia	5.1	7.4	2.8	7.6	5.9	6.9	6.4	7.6	6.9	8.2	5.8	5.5	76.1	-2.5
Georgia	5	8.8	7.1	5.3	4.4	6.5	8	3.8	5	4.7	6.5	6.8	71.9	0.1
Germany	2.3	2.3	3.4	1.5	2.7	1.9	0.7	1.5	0.7	2.3	4.5	0.8	24.6	1
Ghana	4	5.9	3	5.8	6.6	6.8	3.2	6.8	3.8	7.4	3.5	5.5	62.3	-0.7
Greece	3.3	4.1	4	6	3.2	4	5.8	4.3	3.9	4.1	5.3	7.1	55.1	-0.7
Grenada	4.8	5.6	3.6	5.9	4.6	7.7	3.7	4.1	1.5	4.1	2.2	5.9	53.7	-0.6
Guatemala	6.2	7.1	9.3	4.7	6.5	6.5	6.8	6.8	7.6	7.1	5.3	3.4	77.3	-0.2
Guinea	8.7	10	9.4	8	7.5	6.3	9.7	9.4	7.3	8.8	6.2	7.2	98.5	-1.1
Guinea Bissau	7.9	9.9	3.7	7.2	8.9	6.7	9.1	8.9	6	8.9	5.5	7.2	89.9	-1.4
Guyana	6.5	4.8	5.9	3.5	3.9	8.2	4.4	6.1	3.4	5.8	3	6.1	61.6	-2.6
Haiti	6.8	9.7	5.5	8.9	9.2	8.3	9.9	9.8	8.7	8.8	7.7	9.6	102.9	3.2
Honduras	6.8	7	4.9	6.3	6.7	6.7	6.8	7.8	7.6	6.9	5.8	6.3	79.6	0.9
Hungary	1.8	5.3	3.3	4.4	2.6	3.9	6.2	2.8	5.7	3.5	5.4	3.9	48.8	-2
Iceland	0.4	1.8	0.5	2.6	1.5	1.6	0.4	0.9	0.4	1.5	1.5	2.6	15.7	-1.4
India	6	7.3	8.1	6.2	5.8	4.9	4.5	7.3	7.5	8.5	4.1	3.9	74.1	-1.2
Indonesia	5.2	7.1	6.9	4.1	4.4	5.7	4.7	5.9	6.5	7	4.4	3.7	65.6	-1
Iran	7	9.6	9.6	7.6	4.5	4.9	9.8	4.1	9.9	6.8	5.5	6.1	85.4	1.3
Iraq	7.5	9.6	8	6.3	5.7	6.1	8.3	8.3	7.8	8.2	7.7	7.9	91.4	-2.4
Ireland	2.1	1.5	0.5	1.7	1.8	2.5	0.5	1.9	1.6	2.8	1.6	1	19.5	-1.3
Israel	2.6	8.3	3.7	1	3.6	2.4	3.3	1.6	2.9	4.8	1.7	4.8	44.1	1.5
Italy	4.5	4.9	3.7	5.4	2.9	2.5	2	3.9	0.7	4.6	4.3	3.2	42.6	-0.8
Jamaica	7	3.7	1.6	6.9	5.3	9.5	4.2	7	5.2	4.8	2.2	4.5	61.9	-0.2
Japan	1.5	2.6	1.9	3.5	2.9	2.7	0.3	1.8	2.8	5.9	2.6	2	30.5	-0.5
Jordan	4.6	6.9	8.2	6.4	4.4	5.7	6.9	4.8	7.2	6.3	8.4	5.9	75.7	-0.9
Kazakhstan	4	7.9	7.4	5.1	2.6	4.6	8.4	4	7.1	4.1	2.3	3.1	60.6	1.1
Kenya	6.8	8.9	8	6.4	7.4	6.4	7.3	8	6.3	8.1	7.3	6.9	87.8	-0.4
Kuwait	2.4	7.5	4.7	2.6	4.8	2.5	7.2	2.7	7.4	4.4	2	3	51.2	-1
Kyrgyz Republic	5.6	8.2	7.9	6.9	4.9	6.7	8.2	4.7	6.6	5.7	3.9	6.3	75.6	-1.5
Laos	3.9	8.3	7.2	5.1	5.3	6.4	8.9	6.3	6.8	6.4	5.4	4.7	74.7	-0.8
Latvia	2	4.3	7.7	3.9	3.7	5.8	1.8	3.3	1.9	3.2	3	2.7	43.3	0.5

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2023

													Total	<i>Change from Previous Year</i>
Lebanon	7.3	9.6	8.1	9.2	6.6	6.5	7.7	6.8	7.1	5.8	8.8	8.3	91.8	0.5
Lesotho	5.8	7.3	3.1	8.4	7.9	7.5	4.9	7.2	4.9	8.6	3.9	6.8	76.3	-1.1
Liberia	6.8	8.9	4.6	8.3	7.5	6.7	6.2	9.1	7.5	8.4	7.4	7.5	88.9	0.7
Libya	9.5	9.3	7.3	8.9	6.4	5	9.6	8	9.3	6	7.5	9.3	96.1	1.8
Lithuania	2.2	3	2.7	3.7	4.1	5.6	1.2	3.7	1.9	3.6	2.9	4.8	39.4	0.8
Luxembourg	0.4	3.4	1.5	2.4	1.8	1.7	0.3	1.3	1.1	2.4	2.8	0.4	19.5	-0.5
Madagascar	5.7	7.8	3.8	7.7	9.2	5.9	6.7	9.3	6	9.6	5	5	81.7	1.3
Malawi	4.2	8.7	4.1	8.1	7.8	6.4	7.5	8.2	5.1	9.6	6	7.5	83.2	0.2
Malaysia	4.8	6.8	4.8	3	3.5	4.1	6.5	3.7	7.5	5.1	3.2	2	55	-1.4
Maldives	4.9	8.1	3.4	5.2	2.6	5.2	6.9	5.4	6.9	5.2	3.5	5.6	62.9	-1.6
Mali	9.6	7.2	8.5	7.5	7.2	7.7	8.6	8.9	7.5	8.8	8.5	9.5	99.5	0.9
Malta	1.8	2	2.1	3.4	2.3	3.7	2.9	1.8	3.6	3.7	3.2	2.5	33	-1.7
Mauritania	5.7	8.8	7.6	6.3	7.2	5.7	7.8	8.4	6.4	8.6	8.3	6.2	87	-0.9
Mauritius	1	3.1	5	5	3.1	4.2	2.3	3.1	3.6	3.1	1.6	2.9	38	0.1
Mexico	8.3	5.9	6.1	4.5	5.7	4.7	6.3	6.3	5.6	6.9	5.5	4	69.8	-0.5
Micronesia	3.1	5.6	3.7	8.3	6.8	8.4	4.1	6.2	3.3	5.8	4.2	9.8	69.3	-1.7
Moldova	4.5	7.8	5.8	6.4	3.6	8.1	4.9	4.6	3.9	5.4	6	6.4	67.4	2.9
Mongolia	2.9	5.5	2.3	5.1	5.2	4.2	4	4.8	4.2	4.8	2.3	6	51.3	-0.3
Montenegro	4	6.5	9.3	5.8	2.4	5.4	3.9	3.8	2.9	4.1	3.6	6.3	58	0.1
Morocco	4.3	6.6	8.3	5.7	4.8	7.1	6.8	5.1	5.4	4.4	5.1	4.6	68.2	-1.9
Mozambique	7	6.3	7.4	7.7	9.2	7.1	7.1	9.7	7.2	9.6	7.9	7.8	94	-0.3
Myanmar	9.1	9	9.7	7.6	7.3	6.3	9.3	9.1	9.3	7	9.2	7.3	100.2	0.2
Namibia	4.2	3.5	4.2	6.8	6.9	5.9	3.1	7.2	2.2	8.1	3.6	4.6	60.3	-2.6
Nepal	5.5	8.8	8.8	5.1	5.3	6.1	6.6	7.1	6.3	8.1	6.6	5.9	80.2	-0.4
Netherlands	1.8	3.4	3	1.6	1.8	2.3	0.3	1	0.5	2.5	2.4	0.4	21	-1.1
New Zealand	1.6	1.4	2	2.6	2.6	1.6	0.5	1.1	0.5	1.1	1.2	0.5	16.7	-0.8
Nicaragua	5.6	7.1	5.6	6	6.7	7.3	9.1	6.5	7.5	5	5.1	6.2	77.7	0.0
Niger	8.3	9.6	7.7	6.4	7.8	6.6	6.6	9.5	6.7	8.9	7.9	7.4	93.4	-1.8
Nigeria	9	9.6	8.6	8.8	8.1	6.7	8.2	8.8	8.6	9.6	6.4	5.6	98	0.8
North Korea	7.4	9.2	4.6	8.7	7.3	3.2	9.8	8	9.4	7.3	3.2	8.9	87	-2.1
North Macedonia	4.1	7.3	5.4	6.3	4.3	6.4	4.5	4.2	2.4	4.2	6.3	4.9	60.3	-2.3
Norway	1.4	1.1	3.1	1.4	1.4	0.7	0.4	1	0.4	1.4	1.7	0.5	14.5	-1.1
Oman	2.4	6.6	2.9	4.4	4.1	1.4	7.2	3.1	6.7	4.2	1.6	4.1	48.7	-0.8
Pakistan	7.6	9.3	9	6.7	4.9	5.8	7.4	7.5	7.5	8.3	7.6	8.3	89.9	0.2
Palestine	7.9	8.6	5.8	6.2	4.9	8.9	9.1	4.4	7.6	8.3	6.2	10	87.9	2.3
Parana	4.6	2.7	6.2	3.5	6	3.6	3.7	4.9	4.4	4.9	2.4	1.8	48.7	1.2
Papua New Guinea	6.5	7.1	4.5	6.8	8.2	5.9	5.7	9.4	6.7	7.4	4.9	5	78.1	-1.4
Paraguay	5.7	7.8	4.7	4.9	6.9	4.7	6.4	5.7	5.1	5.7	2.9	3.2	63.7	-1.7
Peru	6	8.4	8	4.6	6.2	5.8	7.3	7.2	5.7	7.6	4.5	1.8	73.1	3.3
Philippines	9.1	8	6.8	4.4	4.7	4.9	6.8	6.5	7.5	7.9	5.8	5.4	77.8	-2.7
Poland	1.8	4.2	5	3.6	2.4	4.6	3.7	3	4.4	3.8	5.9	2.8	45.2	3
Portugal	0.3	2.5	0.7	3.9	2.4	3.1	0.8	2.7	1.4	4	1.4	2.5	25.7	-1.8
Qatar	1	5	2.8	1.1	5.3	1.1	6.4	2.3	5.5	3	1.3	5.7	40.5	-1.8
Romania	1.9	5.7	5.4	4	4	5.6	4.4	5	4.1	4.5	4	4.4	53	2.2
Russia	8.3	8.4	7.8	7.7	5.2	3.9	9.1	3.7	9.3	4.8	4.8	7.7	80.7	8.1

Rwanda	5.2	8	9	6.4	7.8	6.1	6.7	6.7	6.2	7.2	7.3	5.7	82.3	-1.4
Samoa	3.6	5.1	5.1	6.9	3.7	10	4.1	4.9	3.8	4.7	3.5	9.7	65.1	0.3
Sao Tome and Principe	4.1	6.3	4.2	8.9	6.7	7.3	3.8	6.6	2.4	6.9	5.2	7.3	69.7	-0.7
Saudi Arabia	5.1	8.5	9.5	7.6	4.8	2.7	7.6	3.8	8.1	4.3	3.2	4.1	65.3	-2.2
Senegal	4.5	7	5.5	6.3	6.3	6.9	3.7	7.9	4.6	7.4	5.8	4.9	71.5	-0.6
Serbia	3.9	8.6	7.8	6.1	4.3	6	5.6	3.9	3.7	4.1	6.8	7.1	67.9	0.1
Seychelles	5.2	6	3.9	3.8	5.3	5.3	3.5	2.4	4.6	4.2	2.3	6.8	53.3	-0.9
Sierra Leone	3.6	7.8	5.4	8.5	7.5	7	5.5	8.6	5.6	8.4	7.4	6.1	81.4	-1
Singapore	0.4	4	2.8	1	3.4	1.3	3.7	1	4.5	2.5	0.5	0.4	25.5	-0.3
Slovakia	1.2	4.7	5.5	4.1	2.2	4	3.2	2.6	2.3	2.6	3.3	2.1	37.8	0.7
Slovenia	0.3	2	3	3.2	2.7	3.6	1.4	2.4	1.4	3.6	2.6	1.1	27.3	-0.4
Solomon Islands	5	8.7	5.5	6.4	7.8	5.9	6.2	8	4	7.1	5	10	79.6	-0.8
Somalia	9.5	10	8.7	9.5	9.1	8.6	9.6	9.8	9	10	9	9.1	111.9	1.4
South Africa	6.6	6.8	6	8.1	6.9	4.5	6.1	7.1	4.8	8	4	3.1	72	0.0
South Korea	1.5	3.9	2.8	1.6	2.8	3.4	2.4	2.4	3.3	2.5	1.1	3.8	31.5	-1.2
South Sudan	9.9	9.2	8.6	8.6	8.6	6.5	9.8	9.7	8.7	9.7	10	9.2	108.5	0.1
Spain	2.8	6.9	7.3	4.5	3.5	1	6.3	2.9	1.8	3.3	1.9	1.3	43.5	-0.9
Sri Lanka	6.8	9.1	8.4	8.3	6	7.6	8	6	8.4	7.2	6.6	7.9	90.3	1.1
Sudan	8.3	9.6	9.3	9.3	8.5	7.5	9.4	8.6	9.2	8.8	9.6	8.1	106.2	-0.9
Suriname	3.4	5.8	7	7.7	4.7	5.7	4	4.7	4	5.5	2.8	4.4	59.7	-1.1
Sweden	2.1	1.8	2.3	1.3	2.3	0.6	0.5	1	1.5	3	3.7	0.5	20.6	-0.3
Switzerland	1.4	1	2.1	1.6	2.4	1	0.3	1.6	0.4	2.4	3.2	0.4	17.8	-1.1
Syria	9.4	9.9	9.1	9.6	6.5	8	10	9	9.1	7.4	9.1	10	107.1	-1.3
Tajikistan	5.5	8.4	6.7	5.7	4.3	5.4	9.4	4.7	8.6	7	3.8	4.7	74.2	-0.8
Tanzania	4.6	6.5	5.2	6.2	7.3	6.4	6.9	8.4	5.6	8.6	4.9	6	76.6	-1.6
Thailand	8	9.7	7.1	3.5	4.3	3.7	7.5	3.5	7.7	6.1	4.9	2	68	-2
Timor-Leste	5.6	8.3	5	7.1	5.9	6.6	4.9	7.2	4.5	8.7	5.7	8	77.5	-1.8
Togo	5.8	7.6	6.6	7	8.1	6.5	7.6	8.1	6.4	7.4	5.7	5.3	82.1	-1.5
Tunisia and Tobago	7.3	5.6	3.4	3.9	4.7	6.8	3.5	4.3	3.5	4.1	2.5	3.3	52.9	0.5
Turkmenistan	6.9	7.5	6.9	8	4.1	5.6	5.7	4.4	5.5	4.3	2.9	4.6	66.4	-1.8
Turkiye	6.6	8.8	9.5	6.9	6.6	3.7	7.3	4.8	8	4.5	8.2	6.3	81.2	3.1
Turkmenistan	4.5	7.8	5.3	5.1	5.6	4.1	9.8	4.1	8	5.6	2.3	2.3	64.5	-2
Uganda	6.3	8.9	7.6	6.4	7.4	6.1	8.2	8	7.2	9.2	8.9	7.3	91.5	-0.6
Ukraine	10	8	6.8	8.5	4.9	8.9	6.4	7.3	7.8	7.3	10	10	95.9	27.3
United Arab Emirates	2.3	3.6	2.2	1.6	3.1	2.1	6.4	2.1	6.8	3.6	1.4	1.8	37	-2.1
United Kingdom	2.9	5.8	6.1	5	3.7	2.4	3.6	2.6	2.7	3.4	2.4	1.3	41.9	1.3
United States	4.7	7.3	6.5	2.1	4	1.7	4.2	2.2	4.2	5.2	2.2	1	45.3	-1.3
Uruguay	3.6	2.7	2.3	4.1	3.3	3.4	0.4	3.2	3.6	3.4	1.8	2.6	34.4	-0.8
Uzbekistan	5.6	8.8	5.4	5.1	5.3	4.8	9	4	7.3	4.3	3.8	3.4	66.8	-2.8
Venezuela	6.7	9.4	6.4	9.4	6.9	6.5	9.6	8.3	8.6	6.5	6.5	5.7	90.5	-1.1
Vietnam	3.5	6.9	4.8	3.6	3.5	4.7	8	3.8	7.5	4.4	3.9	3.7	58.3	-2.6
Yemen	8.6	9.9	8.8	9.9	7.9	6.4	9.8	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.2	108.9	-2.8
Zambia	3.9	5.6	5.9	8.2	9.1	6.3	6.7	8.1	7.5	9.4	4.9	6.2	81.8	-1.8
Zimbabwe	8.4	10	5.9	9.2	7.8	7.1	8.9	8.8	7.8	8.7	7.6	6.7	96.9	-0.9



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